Our Methodology: صافي الثروة Estimates & Tool Reviews

آخر تحديث July 2026

This page covers both halves of the site. For how we estimate net worth, jump to How We Calculate صافي الثروة. For how we test and score software, start here.

We put every tool through the same process before we write a word about it. The goal is simple: figure out whether it genuinely helps your business run better, save time, or bring in more revenue, and then say so plainly.

We test with real, paid accounts and live with each tool inside the kind of workflows people actually run. Demos and sales pages only show the polished version. We want to see where it gets clunky, what breaks under normal use, and how much setup it really takes before you get any value out of it. Because software ships changes constantly, we revisit our picks so the advice stays current.

Hands-on

Tested on real paid accounts and live workflows before we write anything.

Independent

We buy our own subscriptions and answer to readers first.

Kept current

Reviews are refreshed as tools ship new features and pricing.

Never for sale

No amount of money buys a higher score or a better ranking.

What We Test

We spell out the obvious strengths and the less obvious weaknesses, then say who a tool fits well and who should look elsewhere. For outreach and marketing platforms we dig into deliverability, warmup performance, inbox placement, and whether the sending limits hold up once real volume flows through. Whatever the category, we note what changed since our last look so you always see the current picture.

How We Score Every Tool

Each tool is judged on the same six criteria. That keeps our reviews consistent and lets you compare options on the things that actually decide whether a purchase pays off.

01

Real-world performance

Does it do the core job reliably when you put real work through it?

02

Ease of setup

How quickly you get from signup to real value, and how much friction is in the way.

03

القيمة مقابل المال

What you actually pay at real usage levels, weighed against what the tool saves or earns.

04

Support & documentation

How fast and how useful help is when something goes wrong.

05

Integrations

How cleanly it fits the stack most teams already run every day.

06

Scalability

Whether it holds up as your volume, team, and needs grow.

How We Stay Independent

Some of the links on this site are affiliate links. If you buy through one, we may earn a commission at no extra cost to you. Those commissions fund the paid accounts and the hours of hands-on testing that go into every review.

Commissions never buy a better review. Scores, rankings, and recommendations are decided by testing alone. A tool that underperforms gets called out whether we earn a commission on it or not, and any sponsored content is always clearly labeled as such.

We also welcome a right of reply. If a company spots a factual error in our coverage, they can flag it and we will review the evidence, correct what needs correcting, and note what changed.

The same way we used to lay out every assumption and variable when breaking down net worth numbers, we show our reasoning so you can decide whether the conclusions make sense for your own business.

How We Calculate صافي الثروة

Rates and measured data current as of 2026-08-03.

Prefer the story to the tables? How we calculate celebrity net worth, behind the scenes walks through how this system was built, including the mistakes that shaped the rules.

Every YouTuber page on this site is computed by one deterministic program from three kinds of input: measured public data, published rate tables, and documented one-off facts such as a company sale. The same inputs always produce the same number. Nothing on a page is written by hand, and any income lane we cannot yet support with public data is listed openly as one we are still sourcing.

The pipeline, year by year

  1. Measure. Channel catalogs come from the YouTube Data API: views, publish dates, Shorts versus long form (60 seconds is the cut), and which videos carry paid promotions. Sponsored share is measured, never assumed, by combining YouTube’s own paid-promotion flag with description scans for disclosure language, minus the creator’s own brands. Music streams come from Kworb’s public Spotify tracker, lead-artist tracks only.
  2. Date the views. Ad revenue depends on when views happened, not when videos were published. We rebuild each channel’s total-view history from Internet Archive snapshots of its Social Blade page, anchor the series to the live API total, and allocate views to calendar years along it. Channels without at least three snapshots spanning three years fall back to publish-year cohorts, and the page says so.
  3. Price the views. Each calendar year’s long-form views earn that year’s rate: a genre base (median of the sourced disclosures below, each normalized to its era) times an era multiplier times an audience-geography multiplier. Shorts earn a separate rate, and nothing before YouTube turned Shorts monetization on in February 2023. Measured sponsored views earn sourced integration rates, less a 15% management fee.
  4. Subtract real-world costs. Production costs by intensity tier (7.5%, 20%, or 35% of gross), then taxes by the jurisdiction the person actually lived in each year, using the residence timeline on their page.
  5. Subtract spending. What remains is split between spending and saving along the savings-rate curve economists have measured for US households, rising with income.
  6. Compound. Each year’s savings grow at the real calendar-year return of a 60/40 stock/bond portfolio, not a smoothed average. Money earned in 2013 rode 2013’s markets.
  7. Add business stakes. Real transactions first, disclosed revenue times a comparable multiple second, modeled revenue times a low multiple last, with a 25% marketability discount on minority stakes in private companies. When a creator sells, channel statistics freeze at the deal date and the proceeds compound instead.

Evidence tiers and page grades

Every line item carries a tier: DISCLOSED (someone with the real number said it on the record), MEASURED (we counted it in public data), MODELED (measured quantity times a sourced rate), and every revenue lane carries one of these tiers. A page’s grade is the share of its value sitting in the first two tiers: A is 60% or more, B is 30%, C is anything below. Most YouTuber pages are C, which is honest: most of a career is modeled, and the grade says how much.

Ad-rate table: every RPM disclosure we use

RPM is revenue per thousand views after YouTube’s cut. Base cells take the median of their rows, US and global rows only, each row first normalized to the modern era. Rows flagged as upper bounds are shown but excluded from medians. Other geographies enter through the multiplier table, never the base.

RPM disclosures
WhoGenreAudienceYearFormatRPMWhat was disclosedSource
Josh Mayofinanceus_tier12024long_form$29.30creator-stated RPM after pivot to credit cards/investing topics (via aggregator)post-bridge.com
إجماليgeneralعالمي2025long_form$3.50aggregator: most creators earn $2-10 RPM; $3-5 most common (midpoint used)post-bridge.com
إجماليshortsعالمي2025shorts$0.04aggregator: Shorts ~$0.04 per 1k viewspost-bridge.com
Shelby Church (main)tech_lifestyleus_tier12021long_form$9.72creator-disclosed RPM $9.72 (CPM $24.59) on main channelvidchops.com
Shelby Church (vlog)tech_lifestyleus_tier12021long_form$11.49creator-disclosed RPM $11.49 (CPM $27.87); longer videos = more ad breaksvidchops.com
Graham Stephanfinanceus_tier12020long_form$18.00creator-disclosed RPM $16-20 (midpoint), peak months $30+; $2M+ from 134M viewsoutlierkit.com
forum creatorgamingus_tier12013long_form$3.89creator-disclosed avg RPM for gaming videos 2011-2015 (forum post; medium quality)blackhatworld.com
إجماليshortsعالمي2024shorts$0.04typical Shorts RPM $0.01-0.07 per aggregate benchmarksinfluencermarketinghub.com
إجماليshortsus_tier12025shorts$0.32US Shorts RPM case studies up to $0.32 after 2025 parity push (upper bound, not median)air.io
إجماليgeneralindia2026long_form$0.40India RPM Rs15-50 per 1k (~$0.18-0.60, midpoint); median CPM $0.70-0.83upgrowth.in
Hank Greencross_platformus_tier12022tiktok_creator_fund$0.03disclosed TikTok creator fund payout 2.5 cents per 1,000 viewstubefilter.com
AIR network studyautoعالمي2026long_form$5.69Transport niche (car/aviation/build) median RPM from real YouTube Analytics of AIR's 300-channel network (3595 monetized months May 2025-May 2026); P25-P75 $3.17-9.81; 7 channels so directionalair.io
إجماليautoعالمي2026long_form$9.00aggregator: automotive creator RPM $4-14 (midpoint used); CPM $8-25miraflow.ai
Doug DeMuroautous_tier12018long_form$10.00creator-stated upper bound not median: a good video earned $1 per <100 views (RPM >=$10) with many videos hitting it in strong months (My First Million #456 at 40:11)youtube.com
Doug DeMuroautous_tier12017long_form$2.11derived: creator-stated ad revenue of $20k Dec 2016 + $8k Jan 2017 (My First Million #456 at 8:13) over 13.25M channel views in those two months per Internet Archive Social Blade snapshots (2016-07-08, 2017-01-05, 2017-02-09); December window start interpolated across a six-month snapshot gap so the denominator is approximate; window spans the seasonal peak and troughyoutube.com
AIR network studyscience_diyعالمي2026long_form$10.22Education & Science niche median RPM from real YouTube Analytics of AIR's 300-channel network (3595 monetized months May 2025-May 2026); P25-P75 $2.31-19.50; best monetized rate in study (77%)air.io
إجماليscience_diyعالمي2026long_form$10.00aggregator: education creator RPM $5-15 (midpoint used); nearest published niche to science/DIYmiraflow.ai
إجماليscience_diyعالمي2026long_form$5.32'science explained humorously' niche RPM from creator dashboards + industry surveys + OutlierKit analytics, verified June 2026outlierkit.com
إجماليreal_estateعالمي2026long_form$14.00aggregator: real estate creator RPM $8-20 (midpoint used); CPM $15-38; noted to swing with housing-market conditionsmiraflow.ai
إجماليkidsعالمي2025long_form$2.00made-for-kids inventory serves contextual ads only under COPPA; aggregator range $1-3 RPM (midpoint used) vs $5-15 generalgyre.pro
إجماليkidsعالمي2025long_form$1.25made-for-kids channels typically $0.50-2 RPM with behavioral targeting disabled (midpoint used)pastory.app

Two luxury-real-estate creator disclosures exist beyond this table. Enes Yilmazer told the Wall Street Journal in April 2021 he was earning $50,000 to $100,000 a month from YouTube ads, and Erik Conover told the same reporter $10,000 to $30,000 a month. Neither disclosure can be turned into a rate: Yilmazer’s channel has no archived Social Blade snapshots at all, and Conover’s nearest snapshots sit 21 months apart around the disclosure window, wide enough that a derived denominator would be a guess. Both disclosures corroborate the real-estate cell’s direction without being median rows. The cell rests on one aggregate row for now, and the affected page carries a warning saying exactly that.

The base rates the engine actually uses

Resolved RPM base cells (modern era, US audience)
Genre cellBase RPMHow
auto$5.69متوسط ​​الصفوف أعلاه، تم تطبيعه بالعصر
finance$23.65متوسط ​​الصفوف أعلاه، تم تطبيعه بالعصر
gaming$3.50متوسط ​​الصفوف أعلاه، تم تطبيعه بالعصر
general$3.50متوسط ​​الصفوف أعلاه، تم تطبيعه بالعصر
kids$1.62متوسط ​​الصفوف أعلاه، تم تطبيعه بالعصر
real_estate$14.00متوسط ​​الصفوف أعلاه، تم تطبيعه بالعصر
science_diy$10.00متوسط ​​الصفوف أعلاه، تم تطبيعه بالعصر
tech_lifestyle$10.61متوسط ​​الصفوف أعلاه، تم تطبيعه بالعصر
shorts (all genres)$0.04median of Shorts rows; $0 before 2023-02
gaming’s only disclosure is one 2013 forum figure; its era-normalized value lands above general, so gaming is capped at the general cell rather than inventing an uplift from one weak row

Era and geography multipliers

Era and geo multipliers
KindKeyMultiplierTierBasisSource
erapre20120.40MODELEDassumption: ad market immaturity pre-2012; pending historical disclosuresافتراض
era2012_20160.60MODELEDassumption: partial contradiction from gaming 2011-15 disclosure ($3.89 vs $3.50 modern); midpoint stance pending more dataافتراض
era2017_20190.80MODELEDassumption: adpocalypse-era advertiser pullbackافتراض
era2020_plus1.00MODELEDmodern base era: matches vintage of most RPM disclosuresافتراض
geous_tier11.00MODELEDbase geography of most disclosuresافتراض
geoeu_tier10.80MODELEDassumption pending EU disclosuresافتراض
geolatam0.30MODELEDassumption anchored loosely to india ratio (0.11) and v1 practice (0.43-0.75); pending LatAm disclosuresافتراض
geoindia0.11MEASURED_RATIOindia RPM $0.40 / general $3.50 from sourced rowsderived_from_rpm_disclosures
geomixed_global0.70MODELEDassumption for globally mixed audiencesافتراض
rows marked MODELED are assumptions we have not yet been able to source; they are published so they can be challenged

Sponsorship rates

Sponsorship rate sources
TypeCellYearRate typeRateNotesSource
industry_guidebaseline_integration2026cpm_per_1k_views$50.00integrations baseline $30-70 per 1k views (midpoint)creatorsagency.co
industry_guideall_niches_range2026cpm_per_1k_views$47.50overall range $15-80 CPM for integrations (midpoint)outlierkit.com
industry_guidefinance2026cpm_per_1k_views$125finance/investing $50-200 CPM (midpoint); highest verticaloutlierkit.com
industry_guideformat_multiplier_dedicated2026multiplier$1.40dedicated videos 1.3-1.5x integration baselinecreatorsagency.co
industry_guideformat_multiplier_short_mention2026multiplier$0.80sub-60s mentions 0.7-0.9x baselinecreatorsagency.co
industry_guideb2b_saas_multiplier2026multiplier$2.15B2B SaaS pays 1.8-2.5x baseline; lifestyle 0.7-0.9xoutlierkit.com
industry_guidelifestyle_multiplier2026multiplier$0.80lifestyle pays 0.7-0.9x baselineoutlierkit.com
افتراضmanagement_fee2026fee_share$0.15talent management 10-20% on brand deals (midpoint); PENDING SOURCEافتراض
industry_guidegaming_absolute2026cpm_per_1k_views$17.50gaming integrations $10-25 CPM (midpoint); younger audience, lower pricinginfluencerfee.com
industry_guidegaming_absolute2026cpm_per_1k_views$10.00gaming $5-15 CPM range (midpoint); lower-bound sourcecreatorsjet.com
industry_guidetech_lifestyle_absolute2026cpm_per_1k_views$35.00Tech/reviews integrations $25-45 CPM midpoint; hardware brands often add productoutlierkit.com
industry_guidescience_diy_absolute2026cpm_per_1k_views$30.00Education/self-improvement integrations $20-40 CPM midpointoutlierkit.com
industry_guidekids_absolute2026cpm_per_1k_views$12.00Kids brand integrations price below general entertainment; $8-16 midpoint used. Licensed retail is the larger kids lane and sits outside this CPMindustry_synthesis
industry_guideauto_absolute2026cpm_per_1k_views$40.00Automotive brand integrations typically $25-55 CPM midpointindustry_synthesis
industry_guidereal_estate_absolute2026cpm_per_1k_views$55.00Real-estate and home integrations price above general; $40-70 midpointindustry_synthesis
industry_guideeducation_multiplier2026multiplier$1.00Education baseline multiplier when no absolute cell is usedافتراض
industry_guidekids_multiplier2026multiplier$0.50Kids priced at half the general baseline when no absolute cell is usedافتراض
industry_guideauto_multiplier2026multiplier$1.00Auto baseline multiplier when no absolute cell is usedافتراض
industry_guidereal_estate_multiplier2026multiplier$1.20Real estate premium over general baseline when no absolute cell is usedافتراض

Taxes

Effective rates by jurisdiction and year, applied to the residence timeline documented on each page. Corporate structuring that would lower these rates is ignored, which slightly overstates tax and keeps our estimates cautious.

Effective tax rates
JurisdictionYearsIncome typeRateBasisSource
الولايات المتحدة-كاليفورنيا2018–2026ordinary_creator_income45%fed top 37% (TCJA) effective ~34% at $1M+ plus CA ~11% effective; S-corp/QBI mitigations ignored (overstates tax = floor)irs.gov
الولايات المتحدة-كاليفورنيا2013–2017ordinary_creator_income47%fed top 39.6% + CA 13.3% (Prop 30) effective blend at $1M+irs.gov
الولايات المتحدة-كاليفورنيا2003–2012ordinary_creator_income43%fed top 35% + CA ~10% effectiveirs.gov
الولايات المتحدة-ولاية-لا-ضريبة-الدخل2018–2026ordinary_creator_income33%fed only (TX/FL/WA/TN); effective ~33% at $1M+irs.gov
الولايات المتحدة-كاليفورنيا2013–2026long_term_capital_gains35%fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% + CA taxes gains as ordinary ~11% effectiveirs.gov
الولايات المتحدة-ولاية-لا-ضريبة-الدخل2013–2026long_term_capital_gains24%fed 20% + NIIT 3.8%irs.gov
UK2010–2026ordinary_creator_income40%45% additional rate marginal; effective ~40% at high income; Ltd-company dividend planning ignored (overstates = floor)gov.uk
Sweden2010–2026ordinary_creator_income52%municipal ~32% + state 20-25% top; effective ~52%skatteverket.se
Japan2015–2026ordinary_creator_income48%national top 45% + 10% inhabitant tax; effective ~48% at high incomenta.go.jp
Brazil-PJ2015–2026ordinary_creator_income20%creators bill via pessoa juridica (Simples/Lucro Presumido) effective ~15-25%; replaces v1's 50% overchargegov.br
الولايات المتحدة-كاليفورنيا1984–1986ordinary_creator_income55%fed top 50% (pre-TRA86) + CA ~11%; effective blend at top incomesTaxfoundation.org
الولايات المتحدة-كاليفورنيا1987–1987ordinary_creator_income45%TRA86 transition year fed top 38.5% + CATaxfoundation.org
الولايات المتحدة-كاليفورنيا1988–1992ordinary_creator_income36%fed top 28-31% (TRA86 era) + CA 9.3%Taxfoundation.org
الولايات المتحدة-كاليفورنيا1993–2002ordinary_creator_income46%fed top 39.6% (OBRA93) + CA 9.3-11%Taxfoundation.org
الولايات المتحدة-كاليفورنيا1970–1981investment_returns35%fed LTCG max ~28-35% and bond coupons at high ordinary rates; blended effective on a 60/40's total return, CA on topTaxfoundation.org
الولايات المتحدة-كاليفورنيا1982–1996investment_returns30%fed LTCG 20% (1982-86) then 28% (1987-96) plus CA ~9-11% (gains taxed as ordinary in CA) and ordinary rates on bond coupons; blended effectiveTaxfoundation.org
الولايات المتحدة-كاليفورنيا1997–2012investment_returns25%fed LTCG 20% (1997-2002) then 15% (2003-12) plus CA ordinary treatment of gains; blended effectiveTaxfoundation.org
الولايات المتحدة-كاليفورنيا2013–2026investment_returns30%fed LTCG 20% + NIIT 3.8% + CA up to 13.3% (gains ordinary in CA); blended effective on the 60/40's total returnTaxfoundation.org
UK2010–2026investment_returns24%CGT 20% higher-rate plus dividend additional rates; blended effective on a 60/40's total returngov.uk
UK1988–2009ordinary_creator_income40%top rate 40% from 1988-89 through 2009-10; effective ~40% at high incomeifs.org.uk
UK1988–2007investment_returns40%CGT charged at marginal income-tax rates 1988-2008, top 40%ifs.org.uk
UK2008–2009investment_returns18%single 18% CGT rate 2008-2010ifs.org.uk
الولايات المتحدة ونيويورك1984–1986ordinary_creator_income55%fed top 50% era plus NYS+NYC; mirrors the US-CA blend, NY combined top rates track CA within a pointTax.ny.gov
الولايات المتحدة ونيويورك1987–1987ordinary_creator_income45%TRA86 transition year plus NYS+NYCTax.ny.gov
الولايات المتحدة ونيويورك1988–1992ordinary_creator_income36%fed 28-31% plus NYS+NYCTax.ny.gov
الولايات المتحدة ونيويورك1993–2002ordinary_creator_income46%fed 39.6% plus NYS+NYCTax.ny.gov
الولايات المتحدة ونيويورك2003–2012ordinary_creator_income43%fed 35% plus NYS+NYCTax.ny.gov
الولايات المتحدة ونيويورك2013–2017ordinary_creator_income47%fed 39.6% plus NYS 8.82% + NYCTax.ny.gov
الولايات المتحدة ونيويورك2018–2026ordinary_creator_income45%fed 37% plus NYS up to 10.9% + NYCTax.ny.gov
الولايات المتحدة ونيويورك1970–1981investment_returns35%mirrors US-CA blend: high LTCG era plus ordinary-rate bond coupons, state on topTax.ny.gov
الولايات المتحدة ونيويورك1982–1996investment_returns30%fed LTCG 20-28% plus NYS+NYC ordinary treatmentTax.ny.gov
الولايات المتحدة ونيويورك1997–2012investment_returns25%fed LTCG 15-20% plus NYS+NYCTax.ny.gov
الولايات المتحدة ونيويورك2013–2026investment_returns30%fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% + NYS+NYC ordinary treatment of gainsTax.ny.gov
US-MS1987–1992ordinary_creator_income34%fed 28-31% plus MS ~5%dor.ms.gov
US-MS1993–2012ordinary_creator_income43%fed 39.6/35% plus MS 5%dor.ms.gov
US-MS2013–2017ordinary_creator_income44%fed 39.6% plus MS 5%dor.ms.gov
US-MS2018–2026ordinary_creator_income41%fed 37% plus MS ~4.7-5%dor.ms.gov
US-MS1987–1996investment_returns31%fed LTCG 28% plus MS 5% ordinary treatmentdor.ms.gov
US-MS1997–2012investment_returns23%fed LTCG 15-20% plus MS 5%dor.ms.gov
US-MS2013–2026investment_returns28%fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% plus MS ~5%dor.ms.gov
الولايات المتحدة-ولاية-لا-ضريبة-الدخل2013–2026investment_returns24%fed LTCG 20% + NIIT 3.8%, no state income tax (e.g. Florida)irs.gov
الولايات المتحدة-ولاية-لا-ضريبة-الدخل1993–2002ordinary_creator_income42%fed 39.6% effective at high income, no state income tax (e.g. Texas, Florida)irs.gov
الولايات المتحدة-ولاية-لا-ضريبة-الدخل2003–2012ordinary_creator_income37%fed 35% effective, no state income taxirs.gov
الولايات المتحدة-ولاية-لا-ضريبة-الدخل2013–2017ordinary_creator_income42%fed 39.6% + ACA surtaxes, no state income taxirs.gov
الولايات المتحدة-ولاية-لا-ضريبة-الدخل1982–1996investment_returns25%fed LTCG 20-28% and ordinary-rate bond coupons, no stateirs.gov
الولايات المتحدة-ولاية-لا-ضريبة-الدخل1997–2012investment_returns18%fed LTCG 15-20%, no stateirs.gov
Spain2006–2014ordinary_creator_income43%top marginal 43% (2007-09) rising to 52% (2012-14 austerity years); effective blend at her income levelsede.agenciatributaria.gob.es
Spain2006–2014investment_returns21%savings income taxed at flat 18-27% across the erasede.agenciatributaria.gob.es
US-VT2018–2026ordinary_creator_income43%fed top 37% effective ~34% at $1M+ plus VT top 8.75%tax.vermont.gov
US-VT2018–2026investment_returns30%fed LTCG 20% + NIIT 3.8% plus VT ordinary treatment up to 8.75% with a partial exclusion; blended effectivetax.vermont.gov
France2010–2026ordinary_creator_income45%top marginal 45% plus high-income surcharge 3-4%; effective blend at high incomeimpots.gouv.fr
France2010–2026investment_returns30%PFU flat 30% on investment income since 2018; earlier dividend/CGT blends similarimpots.gouv.fr
Australia2008–2026ordinary_creator_income45%top marginal 45% plus 2% Medicare levy; effective blend at high incomeato.gov.au
Australia2008–2026investment_returns24%top rate on gains after the 50% CGT discount; blended effectiveato.gov.au
US-NC2012–2017ordinary_creator_income41%fed top 39.6% effective ~35% at high income plus NC 5.75-5.499% flatirs.gov
US-NC2018–2026ordinary_creator_income38%fed top 37% (TCJA) effective ~33% at high income plus NC flat rate stepping 5.25% down to 4.5%ncdor.gov
الولايات المتحدة-GA2021–2026ordinary_creator_income38%fed top 37% effective ~33% at $1M+ plus GA 5.75% (5.39% flat from 2024; 5.19% 2026)dor.georgia.gov
US-OH2013–2026ordinary_creator_income37%fed effective ~33% at $1M+ plus OH top bracket ~4% (4.797% pre-2021 then 3.99%; 3.5% from 2024)tax.ohio.gov
US-PR2021–2026ordinary_creator_income28%bona fide PR resident under Act 60: mainland-source fight and appearance and US-platform income keeps federal rates while PR-source export-services and investment income runs 4% and 0%; 28% blend weighted toward the federally taxed mainland incomehklaw.com
الولايات المتحدة-نيو جيرسي1982–1986ordinary_creator_income50%fed top 50% era plus NJ 2.5%, well below the NY/CA state layernj.gov
الولايات المتحدة-نيو جيرسي1987–1987ordinary_creator_income41%TRA86 transition year plus NJ 3.5%nj.gov
الولايات المتحدة-نيو جيرسي1988–1992ordinary_creator_income33%fed 28-31% plus NJ 3.5%nj.gov
الولايات المتحدة-نيو جيرسي1993–2002ordinary_creator_income44%fed 39.6% plus NJ 6.37%nj.gov
الولايات المتحدة-نيو جيرسي2003–2012ordinary_creator_income42%fed 35% plus NJ 8.97%nj.gov
الولايات المتحدة-نيو جيرسي2013–2017ordinary_creator_income46%fed 39.6% plus ACA surtaxes plus NJ 8.97%nj.gov
الولايات المتحدة-نيو جيرسي2018–2026ordinary_creator_income44%fed 37% plus NJ up to 10.75%nj.gov
الولايات المتحدة-نيو جيرسي1982–1996investment_returns28%fed LTCG 20-28% plus NJ ordinary treatmentnj.gov
الولايات المتحدة-نيو جيرسي1997–2012investment_returns23%fed LTCG 15-20% plus NJnj.gov
الولايات المتحدة-نيو جيرسي2013–2026investment_returns28%fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% plus NJ ordinary treatment of gainsnj.gov
US-IN2005–2026ordinary_creator_income38%fed effective ~33% at $1M+ plus IN flat state rate (3.4% 2013-14, 3.23% 2017-22, 3.05% 2024, 2.95% 2026) plus county local income tax (Marion County 2.02%) | year_from extended to 2005: IN had a flat state individual income tax well before 2013 (rates near 3.4%); fed layer same shape as later rows. County local still applies for Indy-area residents.in.gov
US-IN2005–2026investment_returns29%fed LTCG 20% + NIIT 3.8% plus IN flat-rate ordinary treatment of gains plus county local income tax; blended effective on the 60/40's total return | year_from extended to 2005: IN had a flat state individual income tax well before 2013 (rates near 3.4%); fed layer same shape as later rows. County local still applies for Indy-area residents.in.gov
الولايات المتحدة-كاليفورنيا1955–1963ordinary_creator_income53%fed top 91% marginal (1954-63), effective blend ~47% at $1M+ well under the headline after averaging, shelters and the era's alternative maximum; plus CA ~6-7%Taxfoundation.org
الولايات المتحدة-كاليفورنيا1964–1964ordinary_creator_income53%Revenue Act of 1964 transition year fed top 77% marginal effective ~46% plus CA ~7%Taxfoundation.org
الولايات المتحدة-كاليفورنيا1965–1970ordinary_creator_income54%fed top 70% marginal effective ~45% at high income (still no cap on earned income) plus CA ~8-9% rising toward the 1973 plateauTaxfoundation.org
الولايات المتحدة-كاليفورنيا1971–1983ordinary_creator_income55%TRA69's maximum tax on earned income (60% in 1971, 50% from 1972) then ERTA's 50% top rate from 1982 kept the federal effective near 44% on salary and fee income; plus CA reaching 11% by 1973Taxfoundation.org
الولايات المتحدة-كاليفورنيا1955–1969investment_returns27%25% alternative-tax ceiling on long-term gains (1954-67, still in force through 1969 before TRA69's minimum tax on preferences hit 1970 returns) plus bond coupons at ordinary rates and CA ~6-7%Taxfoundation.org
الولايات المتحدة ونيويورك1975–1977ordinary_creator_income56%fed 50%-cap era (~44% effective) plus NY's all-time peak, 15% state topped by a brief surcharge (15.375% in 1975) and NYC up to 4.3%, combined state and city near 19.7% in 1976Tax.ny.gov
الولايات المتحدة ونيويورك1978–1981ordinary_creator_income55%fed 50%-cap era plus NY's earned-income top rate phased down from 15% to 10% over these years plus NYCTax.ny.gov
الولايات المتحدة ونيويورك1982–1983ordinary_creator_income54%fed 50% (ERTA) plus NY settled near 10% state plus NYC; mirrors US-CA just ahead of the 1984 rowTax.ny.gov
الولايات المتحدة-ولاية-لا-ضريبة-الدخل1966–1970ordinary_creator_income42%fed top 70% marginal, effective ~42% at high income after averaging and shelters, no state income taxTaxfoundation.org
الولايات المتحدة-ولاية-لا-ضريبة-الدخل1971–1986ordinary_creator_income40%TRA69's maximum tax on earned income (60% in 1971, 50% from 1972) then ERTA's 50% top rate from 1982, a harder ceiling than the old 70% bracket; no state income taxTaxfoundation.org
الولايات المتحدة-ولاية-لا-ضريبة-الدخل1987–1987ordinary_creator_income36%TRA86 transition year fed top 38.5%, no state income taxTaxfoundation.org
الولايات المتحدة-ولاية-لا-ضريبة-الدخل1988–1992ordinary_creator_income30%fed 28-31% (TRA86 era), no state income taxTaxfoundation.org
الولايات المتحدة-ولاية-لا-ضريبة-الدخل1966–1969investment_returns22%25% alternative-tax ceiling on long-term gains, no state, before TRA69's minimum tax on preferences hit 1970 returnsTaxfoundation.org
الولايات المتحدة-ولاية-لا-ضريبة-الدخل1970–1981investment_returns29%fed LTCG effective rate climbed toward its historical peak as the minimum tax on excluded gains stacked the alternative tax up near 39.875% by 1976, plus bond coupons at ordinary rates, no stateTaxfoundation.org
UK1939–1945ordinary_creator_income58%wartime escalation, standard rate plus surtax rose from 29%+41% (1939, over GBP 50k) to 50%+48% (1944/45, over GBP 20k) for a 98% nominal ceiling; effective blend well under that given wartime reliefsifs.org.uk
UK1946–1973ordinary_creator_income56%postwar surtax system kept the nominal top rate around 90-97.5% into the 1960s; effective blend well under the headline given reliefs and avoidanceifs.org.uk
UK1974–1978ordinary_creator_income52%83% top rate on earned income from 1974 under the unified system; the top 1% paid just 11% of all income tax collected in 1978/79, evidence of how far effective fell below headlineifs.org.uk
UK1979–1987ordinary_creator_income47%the 1979 budget cut the top rate from 83% to 60%; effective blend at high income ahead of the 1988 cut to 40%ifs.org.uk
UK1939–1964investment_returns25%no UK capital gains tax existed before 1965, so the 60% gains share of a blended return went untaxed; the 40% dividend and interest share paid the era's high unearned-income ratestax.org.uk
UK1965–1973investment_returns39%the 1965 Finance Act introduced a flat 30% capital gains tax while dividends and interest stayed inside the old surtax system at high unearned-income ratestax.org.uk
UK1974–1978investment_returns42%30% flat CGT continued while the income share of the blend faced the 83% rate plus a 15% investment income surcharge (98% combined)ifs.org.uk
UK1979–1987investment_returns35%30% flat CGT continued while the income share fell with the 1979 rate cut to 60% and the surcharge wound down, abolished in 1985ifs.org.uk
Spain2005–2005ordinary_creator_income44%45% top state+regional marginal under the 2003-06 regime; Beckham Law launched this year at a 24% flat rate but was closed to professional athletes by a 2010 amendment, so this row uses the ordinary progressive schedulesede.agenciatributaria.gob.es
Spain2005–2005investment_returns15%pre-2007-reform: long-term gains (held over 1 year) taxed at a flat 15%; the unified savings-income (ahorro) schedule the 2006-2014 row uses did not start until 2007sede.agenciatributaria.gob.es
Spain2015–2020ordinary_creator_income43%top state+regional marginal eased to roughly 43-45% after the 2015 Montoro reform pulled back the 2012-14 debt-crisis surcharge peak of 52%; effective blend at high incomesede.agenciatributaria.gob.es
Spain2015–2020investment_returns22%2015 reform introduced the tiered ahorro (savings) schedule at 19/21/23%; a $1M+ portfolio sits mostly in the 23% top tiersede.agenciatributaria.gob.es
Spain2021–2026ordinary_creator_income47%2021 reform added a new top state bracket above EUR300k pushing the combined state+regional marginal to roughly 47-49% nationally (higher still in Catalonia); effective blend at high incomesede.agenciatributaria.gob.es
Spain2021–2026investment_returns27%ahorro top rate stepped up from 26% (2021-22) to 27-28% (2023-24) to 30% (2025-26 income); blended across the erasede.agenciatributaria.gob.es
Australia2002–2005ordinary_creator_income47%top marginal 47% (2001-02 through 2005-06; threshold $60k) plus 1.5% Medicare levy; effective blend at high incomeato.gov.au
Australia2002–2005investment_returns24%50% CGT discount (in effect since Sept 1999) on the 47% top marginal plus Medicare levy; blended effectiveato.gov.au
Australia2006–2007ordinary_creator_income45%top marginal cut to 45% from 2006-07 (threshold raised to $150k) plus 1.5% Medicare levy; effective blend and continuous with the 2008 rowato.gov.au
Australia2006–2007investment_returns24%50% CGT discount on the 2006-07 cut to 45% top marginal; blended effective and continuous with the 2008 rowato.gov.au
India1973–1974ordinary_creator_income65%headline top marginal plus surcharge reached 97.75% in FY1973-74 but was rarely realized at that level given agricultural-income exclusion, HUF income-splitting and PF/insurance exemptions; 0.65 is a defensible effective ceiling, not the headlineIncometaxindia.gov.in
India1975–1984ordinary_creator_income55%1974-75 reform capped the top rate near 70% (about 75% with surcharge); effective still well under headline given the same exemption channelsIncometaxindia.gov.in
India1985–1991ordinary_creator_income45%1985-86 reform cut brackets from eight to four and the top marginal to 50%; effective blend closer to headline as base-broadening trimmed the exemption gapIncometaxindia.gov.in
India1992–1996ordinary_creator_income37%1992-93 liberalization reform cut the top marginal to 40% above Rs 1 lakh; effective blend at high incomeIncometaxindia.gov.in
India1997–2012ordinary_creator_income30%the 1997 budget cut the top marginal to 30% where it stayed nominally flat for 15 years; effective close to the flat headline at $1M+ incomeIncometaxindia.gov.in
India2013–2018ordinary_creator_income34%a 10% surcharge on incomes above Rs 1 crore (2013-14) rose toward 15% by 2016-17 on top of the 30% base plus cess; effective blend at high incomeIncometaxindia.gov.in
India2019–2026ordinary_creator_income42%the 2019 budget's 37% surcharge on income above Rs 5 crore pushed the effective top rate to the widely cited 42.74% (30% base times 1.37 surcharge plus 4% cess); the 2023 new-regime option caps the surcharge at 25% insteadIncometaxindia.gov.in
India1973–1991investment_returns30%pre-1992 capital gains rules gave long-term holdings concessional treatment relative to the very high ordinary-income rates of the era; blended effective on a diversified portfolioIncometaxindia.gov.in
India1992–2003investment_returns20%1992 reform introduced indexed long-term capital gains at 20%; dividends were sheltered from the shareholder by dividend distribution tax charged at the company level insteadIncometaxindia.gov.in
India2004–2017investment_returns5%the Securities Transaction Tax regime from October 2004 made long-term gains on STT-paid listed equity fully exempt; dividends stayed DDT-sheltered at the company level; a listed-equity-heavy portfolio's blended effective fell close to zeroIncometaxindia.gov.in
India2018–2026investment_returns14%the 2018 budget reintroduced equity LTCG at 10% above a Rs 1 lakh exemption (12.5% without indexation from July 2024); DDT was abolished in 2020 so dividends are now taxed in the shareholder's hands at slab ratesIncometaxindia.gov.in
Hong Kong1962–2026ordinary_creator_income15%salaries tax is capped by a standard rate that has held in a narrow 15-17% band for decades (two-tiered 15%/16% above HK$5 million from 2024-25); the standard rate is a hard ceiling so it doubles as the effective rate for top earnersgov.hk
Hong Kong1962–2026investment_returns1%Hong Kong has no capital gains tax and no dividend or interest tax for an individual not carrying on a trade; profits tax only applies if gains are ruled to be trading income which is not the assumption heregov.hk
CA-AB2015–2026ordinary_creator_income46%federal top bracket rose to 33% in 2016 and Alberta moved from a flat 10% to a progressive provincial scale topping out at 15% (over $355k); combined top about 48% with 2015 itself a lower transition yearTaxsummaries.pwc.com
CA-AB2015–2026investment_returns23%Canada includes only 50% of a capital gain in taxable income; a 2024 proposal to raise the inclusion rate to 66.67% was cancelled in March 2025 so it stayed at 50%; half of the about-48% combined top marginal applied to the taxable halfTaxsummaries.pwc.com
IE2015–2026ordinary_creator_income49%income tax 40% plus USC up to 8% plus PRSI 4% combine to a top marginal near 52% for an employee; low band thresholds mean a $1M+ earner's effective sits close to that ceilingTaxsummaries.pwc.com
IE2015–2026investment_returns35%CGT flat at 33% since December 2012 but Ireland gives dividends and interest no preferential rate so both are taxed at the roughly 52% marginal; blended effective on a 60/40 total return sits above the pure CGT rateTaxsummaries.pwc.com
NL2016–2020ordinary_creator_income51%Box 1 employment and business income top rate held near 52% easing to 51.75% in 2020 on income above roughly EUR68k; effective blend at high incomeTaxsummaries.pwc.com
NL2021–2026ordinary_creator_income48%Box 1 top rate simplified down to 49.5% from 2021; effective blend at high incomeTaxsummaries.pwc.com
NL2016–2022investment_returns30%Box 3 does not tax actual investment income; it taxes a deemed notional yield on net wealth at a flat rate (30% in this window rising to 31% by 2022) a mechanism with no direct equivalent elsewhere in this tableTaxsummaries.pwc.com
NL2023–2026investment_returns34%after the 2021 Supreme Court ruling that taxing unrealized deemed returns can violate property rights the Box 3 rate was pushed higher instead of abolished (32% in 2023 up to 36% by 2025-26) pending a full overhaul in 2028; still a deemed yield not actual gainsTaxsummaries.pwc.com
BR2017–2026ordinary_creator_income27%personal progressive schedule tops out at 27.5% above a low monthly threshold; unlike Brazil-PJ's pessoa-juridica routing used by creators (about 20% effective) a club-salaried athlete has no PJ shelter and sits on the personal schedulegov.br
BR2017–2026investment_returns17%equity capital gains flat at 15%; other capital gains progressive 15-22.5% since the January 2017 reform; dividends from Brazilian companies remain tax-exempt to the individual shareholder; blended effective on a 60/40 total returngov.br
RS2008–2026ordinary_creator_income24%flat 10% wage tax withheld at source plus a separate annual tax on aggregate income above 3x the average annual salary (10% up to 6x average; 15% above); a $1M+ earner clears the 6x threshold many times overTaxsummaries.pwc.com
RS2008–2026investment_returns15%capital gains and dividends sit outside the wage-tax and annual-surtax aggregation and are taxed on their own flat schedule generally 15%Taxsummaries.pwc.com
CH2004–2026ordinary_creator_income22%assumes the documented canton of Schwyz (Wollerau/Freienbach), one of the lowest-tax communes in Switzerland at a combined federal, cantonal and communal top marginal near 19-23% versus roughly 40% in Zurich city; canton choice is the decisive variable hereTaxsummaries.pwc.com
CH2004–2026investment_returns3%private capital gains on movable assets are fully exempt at federal and cantonal level; the figure is not zero because dividends and bond interest within a blended portfolio remain taxable as ordinary income at the cantonal marginal rateTaxsummaries.pwc.com
JM2008–2016ordinary_creator_income25%flat 25% PAYE marginal rate before the 2016-17 threshold reform; effective close to the flat headline at $1M+ income given the modest tax-free threshold of the eraTaxsummaries.pwc.com
JM2017–2026ordinary_creator_income29%the 2016-17 reform paired a higher tax-free threshold with a new 30% top tier above J$6 million a year; a $1M+ USD earner is deep into that top band so effective sits close to 30%Taxsummaries.pwc.com
JM2008–2026investment_returns13%Jamaica has no capital gains tax regime at all (only a 2% property transfer tax); dividends are withheld at a final 15% and bank interest at 25% which is what keeps the blended effective on a 60/40 total return well above zeroTaxsummaries.pwc.com
US-MA2001–2002ordinary_creator_income44%fed top 39.6% effective ~35% at high income plus MA 5.6% (2001) stepping to 5.3% (2002)Mass.gov
US-MA2003–2012ordinary_creator_income39%fed top 35% plus MA flat 5.3% (the final cut to 5.0% was delayed by the 2002 revenue act)Mass.gov
US-MA2013–2017ordinary_creator_income44%fed top 39.6% plus ACA surtaxes plus MA 5.3% stepping to 5.1%Mass.gov
US-MA2018–2022ordinary_creator_income38%fed top 37% effective ~33% at $1M+ plus MA 5.1% stepping to 5.0%Mass.gov
US-MA2023–2026ordinary_creator_income42%fed top 37% plus MA flat 5.0% plus the 4% Fair Share surtax on income over $1M, 9% combined at this earner's income levelMass.gov
US-MA2001–2012investment_returns20%fed LTCG 15-20% plus MA taxing long-term gains like ordinary income at its flat 5.3-5.6% rateMass.gov
US-MA2013–2022investment_returns27%fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% plus MA ordinary treatment of long-term gains at its flat ~5.1% rateMass.gov
US-MA2023–2026investment_returns33%fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% plus MA 5.0% plus the 4% Fair Share surtax, which hits capital gains dollar for dollar with no separate thresholdMass.gov
الولايات المتحدة ولوس أنجلوس2001–2002ordinary_creator_income45%fed top 39.6% effective ~35% plus LA's graduated 2/4/6% brackets (top 6%) discounted for LA's uncapped federal income tax deduction (repealed 2022)الإيرادات. louisiana.gov
الولايات المتحدة ولوس أنجلوس2003–2012ordinary_creator_income41%fed top 35% plus LA top 6% net of the federal income tax deduction that shrank LA's taxable base for high earnersالإيرادات. louisiana.gov
الولايات المتحدة ولوس أنجلوس2013–2017ordinary_creator_income45%fed top 39.6% plus ACA surtaxes plus LA top 6% net of the federal deductionالإيرادات. louisiana.gov
الولايات المتحدة ولوس أنجلوس2018–2021ordinary_creator_income37%fed top 37% plus LA top 6%, still net of the federal deduction which ran through 2021الإيرادات. louisiana.gov
الولايات المتحدة ولوس أنجلوس2022–2024ordinary_creator_income37%fed top 37% plus LA's reformed 4.25% top bracket, now a straight add since the 2021 repeal of the federal income tax deduction was paired with the rate cutالإيرادات. louisiana.gov
الولايات المتحدة ولوس أنجلوس2025–2026ordinary_creator_income36%fed top 37% plus LA's new flat 3% rate (graduated brackets repealed)الإيرادات. louisiana.gov
الولايات المتحدة ولوس أنجلوس1997–2012investment_returns22%fed LTCG 15-20% plus LA gains taxed as ordinary at its top 6% bracket net of the federal income tax deductionالإيرادات. louisiana.gov
الولايات المتحدة ولوس أنجلوس2013–2021investment_returns28%fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% plus LA ordinary treatment of gains at 6% net of the federal deductionالإيرادات. louisiana.gov
الولايات المتحدة ولوس أنجلوس2022–2026investment_returns28%fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% plus LA ordinary treatment of gains at its post-repeal 4.25% (2022-24) then flat 3% (2025-26) rate, no longer discounted by a federal deductionالإيرادات. louisiana.gov
الولايات المتحدة-SC1982–1986ordinary_creator_income53%fed top 50% (ERTA) plus SC top 7%dor.sc.gov
الولايات المتحدة-SC1987–1987ordinary_creator_income41%TRA86 transition year fed top 38.5% plus SC top 7%dor.sc.gov
الولايات المتحدة-SC1988–1992ordinary_creator_income35%fed top 28-31% plus SC top 7%dor.sc.gov
الولايات المتحدة-SC1993–2002ordinary_creator_income45%fed top 39.6% plus SC top 7%dor.sc.gov
الولايات المتحدة-SC2003–2012ordinary_creator_income40%fed top 35% plus SC top 7%dor.sc.gov
الولايات المتحدة-SC2013–2017ordinary_creator_income45%fed top 39.6% plus ACA surtaxes plus SC top 7%dor.sc.gov
الولايات المتحدة-SC2018–2021ordinary_creator_income40%fed top 37% plus SC top 7% (last year before the 2022 rate-cut schedule began)dor.sc.gov
الولايات المتحدة-SC2022–2026ordinary_creator_income39%fed top 37% plus SC's top bracket stepping down from 6.5% (2022) to 6.2%, then 6%, then a 5.21% two-bracket system by 2026dor.sc.gov
الولايات المتحدة-SC1982–1996investment_returns27%fed LTCG 20-28% plus SC's 44% net capital gains exclusion against its 7% top bracket (56% of the gain is SC-taxable)dor.sc.gov
الولايات المتحدة-SC1997–2012investment_returns20%fed LTCG 15-20% plus SC's 44% exclusion against its 7% top bracketdor.sc.gov
الولايات المتحدة-SC2013–2026investment_returns27%fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% plus SC's 44% net capital gains exclusion against a top bracket stepping from 7% down to 6%dor.sc.gov
الولايات المتحدة-CT1991–1992ordinary_creator_income32%fed top 28-31% (OBRA90) plus CT's brand-new income tax: 1.5% in its first year (1991), stepping to a flat 4.5% (1992)portal.ct.gov
الولايات المتحدة-CT1993–2002ordinary_creator_income44%fed top 39.6% plus CT flat 4.5%cga.ct.gov
الولايات المتحدة-CT2003–2012ordinary_creator_income39%fed top 35% plus CT's top rate, raised from 4.5% to 5% (2003) then to 6.7% (2011)cga.ct.gov
الولايات المتحدة-CT2013–2017ordinary_creator_income45%fed top 39.6% plus ACA surtaxes plus CT's top rate, 6.7% stepping to 6.99% (2015)cga.ct.gov
الولايات المتحدة-CT2018–2026ordinary_creator_income40%fed top 37% plus CT top bracket 6.99%cga.ct.gov
الولايات المتحدة-CT1991–1996investment_returns27%fed LTCG 20-28% plus CT's transition from the old 7% capital gains tax (cut to 4.75% in August 1991) to the new unified income tax's flat 4.5% rate on all incomeportal.ct.gov
الولايات المتحدة-CT1997–2012investment_returns23%fed LTCG 15-20% plus CT's top rate under the unified income tax, 4.5% stepping to 5% (2003) then 6.7% (2011)cga.ct.gov
الولايات المتحدة-CT2013–2026investment_returns29%fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% plus CT ordinary treatment of gains at its top bracket, 6.7% stepping to 6.99% (2015)cga.ct.gov
الولايات المتحدة طن متري1982–1986ordinary_creator_income54%fed top 50% plus MT top 11%archive.legmt.gov
الولايات المتحدة طن متري1987–1987ordinary_creator_income43%TRA86 transition year fed top 38.5% plus MT top 11%archive.legmt.gov
الولايات المتحدة طن متري1988–1992ordinary_creator_income36%fed top 28-31% plus MT top 11%archive.legmt.gov
الولايات المتحدة طن متري1993–2002ordinary_creator_income46%fed top 39.6% plus MT top 11%archive.legmt.gov
الولايات المتحدة طن متري2003–2012ordinary_creator_income40%fed top 35% plus MT's post-reform top rate 6.9% (SB 407 collapsed the old bracket structure down from 11%)archive.legmt.gov
الولايات المتحدة طن متري2013–2017ordinary_creator_income45%fed top 39.6% plus ACA surtaxes plus MT top 6.9%archive.legmt.gov
الولايات المتحدة طن متري2018–2023ordinary_creator_income40%fed top 37% plus MT top 6.9%archive.legmt.gov
الولايات المتحدة طن متري2024–2026ordinary_creator_income39%fed top 37% plus MT's simplified two-bracket top rate, cut to 5.9% (2024-25) then 5.65% (2026)archive.legmt.gov
الولايات المتحدة طن متري1982–1996investment_returns29%fed LTCG 20-28% plus MT's 11% top bracket applied to gains as ordinary income (pre-2003, before the capital gains credit existed)montanabudget.org
الولايات المتحدة طن متري1997–2012investment_returns21%fed LTCG 15-20% plus MT's 11% bracket on gains through 2002, then a new 2% capital gains credit against the 6.9% rate from 2005 (net 4.9%)montanabudget.org
الولايات المتحدة طن متري2013–2026investment_returns27%fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% plus MT's 2% capital gains credit against its top bracket, netting roughly 4.9% (6.9% top rate) down to about 3.7% (post-2024 top rate)montanabudget.org
الولايات المتحدة-مرحبا1986–1986ordinary_creator_income53%fed top 50% (pre-TRA86, last year) plus HI top 8.25%tfhawaii.org
الولايات المتحدة-مرحبا1987–1987ordinary_creator_income42%TRA86 transition year fed top 38.5% plus HI top 8.25%tfhawaii.org
الولايات المتحدة-مرحبا1988–1992ordinary_creator_income35%fed top 28-31% plus HI top 8.25%tfhawaii.org
الولايات المتحدة-مرحبا1993–2002ordinary_creator_income45%fed top 39.6% plus HI top 8.25%tfhawaii.org
الولايات المتحدة-مرحبا2003–2008ordinary_creator_income40%fed top 35% plus HI top 8.25%tfhawaii.org
الولايات المتحدة-مرحبا2009–2012ordinary_creator_income41%fed top 35% plus HI's temporary top bracket, raised to 11% for 2009-2015 by Act 60tfhawaii.org
الولايات المتحدة-مرحبا2013–2015ordinary_creator_income46%fed top 39.6% plus ACA surtaxes plus HI's temporary 11% top bracket (expired end of 2015)tfhawaii.org
الولايات المتحدة-مرحبا2016–2017ordinary_creator_income45%fed top 39.6% plus ACA surtaxes plus HI back to 8.25% after the temporary brackets expiredtfhawaii.org
الولايات المتحدة-مرحبا2018–2026ordinary_creator_income44%fed top 37% plus HI's 11% top bracket, made permanent for tax years after 2017tax.hawaii.gov
الولايات المتحدة-مرحبا1986–1996investment_returns28%fed LTCG 20-28% plus HI's capital gains rate cap of 7.25%, materially below its ordinary top bracket throughout this periodhitaxfairness.org
الولايات المتحدة-مرحبا1997–2012investment_returns21%fed LTCG 15-20% plus HI's 7.25% capital gains caphitaxfairness.org
الولايات المتحدة-مرحبا2013–2026investment_returns29%fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% plus HI's 7.25% capital gains cap, unaffected by the ordinary-rate swings to 11%hitaxfairness.org
الولايات المتحدة-CO1989–1992ordinary_creator_income34%fed top 28-31% plus CO's flat tax, 5% since 1987content.leg.colorado.gov
الولايات المتحدة-CO1993–2002ordinary_creator_income44%fed top 39.6% plus CO's flat rate, 5% through 1998 then 4.75% (1999) and 4.63% (2000-02)content.leg.colorado.gov
الولايات المتحدة-CO2003–2012ordinary_creator_income39%fed top 35% plus CO flat 4.63%content.leg.colorado.gov
الولايات المتحدة-CO2013–2017ordinary_creator_income44%fed top 39.6% plus ACA surtaxes plus CO flat 4.63%content.leg.colorado.gov
الولايات المتحدة-CO2018–2021ordinary_creator_income38%fed top 37% plus CO's flat rate, 4.63% cut to 4.55% by Proposition 116 (2020)content.leg.colorado.gov
الولايات المتحدة-CO2022–2026ordinary_creator_income37%fed top 37% plus CO's flat rate cut to 4.40% by Proposition 121 (2022)content.leg.colorado.gov
الولايات المتحدة-CO1989–1996investment_returns27%fed LTCG 20-28% plus CO's flat 5% rate applied to gains as ordinary incomecontent.leg.colorado.gov
الولايات المتحدة-CO1997–2012investment_returns20%fed LTCG 15-20% plus CO's flat rate, 5% stepping down to 4.63% by 2000, applied to gains as ordinary incomecontent.leg.colorado.gov
الولايات المتحدة-CO2013–2026investment_returns27%fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% plus CO's flat rate, 4.63% stepping down to 4.40%, applied to gains as ordinary incomecontent.leg.colorado.gov
US-WI2013–2017ordinary_creator_income45%fed top 39.6% plus ACA surtaxes plus WI top bracket 7.65%revenue.wi.gov
US-WI2018–2026ordinary_creator_income41%fed top 37% plus WI top bracket 7.65% (unchanged since the 2013 cut from 7.75%)revenue.wi.gov
US-WI2013–2026investment_returns28%fed 20% (NIIT 3.8% from 2013) plus WI's 30% long-term capital gains exclusion applied against its 7.65% top bracket, so 70% of the gain is WI-taxablerevenue.wi.gov
الولايات المتحدة-أريزونا2007–2012ordinary_creator_income39%fed top 35% plus AZ top bracket 4.54% (in place since a 2006 rate cut)Taxfoundation.org
الولايات المتحدة-أريزونا2013–2017ordinary_creator_income44%fed top 39.6% plus ACA surtaxes plus AZ top 4.54%Taxfoundation.org
الولايات المتحدة-أريزونا2018–2022ordinary_creator_income38%fed top 37% plus AZ top 4.54%; Prop 208's 3.5% surcharge notionally began 2021 but was capped then struck down by the AZ Supreme Court in August 2022, so top earners paid little more than the base rateTaxfoundation.org
الولايات المتحدة-أريزونا2023–2026ordinary_creator_income36%fed top 37% plus AZ's new flat 2.5% rate, replacing the old graduated bracketsTaxfoundation.org
الولايات المتحدة-أريزونا2007–2012investment_returns20%fed LTCG 15-20% plus AZ gains taxed as ordinary income at its 4.54% top bracketTaxfoundation.org
الولايات المتحدة-أريزونا2013–2022investment_returns27%fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% plus AZ ordinary treatment of gains at its 4.54% top bracketTaxfoundation.org
الولايات المتحدة-أريزونا2023–2026investment_returns26%fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% plus AZ's flat 2.5% rate applied to gains as ordinary incomeTaxfoundation.org
US-MO2018–2026ordinary_creator_income38%fed top 37% effective ~33% at $1M+ plus MO's top bracket on its post-2018 glide path, 5.9% (2018) down to 4.7% (2025-26)dor.mo.gov
US-MO2018–2024investment_returns29%fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% plus MO gains taxed as ordinary income on the same glide path down to 4.8%dor.mo.gov
US-MO2025–2026investment_returns24%fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% only, since HB 594 (2025) made Missouri the first state to fully exempt individual capital gains from its income taxdor.mo.gov
US-KS2013–2017ordinary_creator_income44%fed top 39.6% plus ACA surtaxes plus KS's top rate, cut to 4.9% (2013-14) then frozen at 4.6% (2015-17)ksrevenue.gov
US-KS2018–2026ordinary_creator_income39%fed top 37% plus KS's top rate, restored to 5.7% in 2017, then cut to 5.58% by the 2024 reformksrevenue.gov
US-KS2013–2026investment_returns28%fed blend of 15-20% LTCG plus NIIT from 2013 plus KS gains taxed as ordinary income across the same 4.6-5.7% rate historyksrevenue.gov
الولايات المتحدة-GA1992–1992ordinary_creator_income34%fed top 28-31% (last year of this bracket) plus GA's longstanding top bracket 6%dor.georgia.gov
الولايات المتحدة-GA1993–2002ordinary_creator_income44%fed top 39.6% plus GA top 6%dor.georgia.gov
الولايات المتحدة-GA2003–2012ordinary_creator_income39%fed top 35% plus GA top 6%dor.georgia.gov
الولايات المتحدة-GA2013–2017ordinary_creator_income44%fed top 39.6% plus ACA surtaxes plus GA top 6%dor.georgia.gov
الولايات المتحدة-GA2018–2020ordinary_creator_income39%fed top 37% plus GA's top rate, 6% in 2018 then cut to 5.75% by HB 918 from 2019dor.georgia.gov
الولايات المتحدة-GA1992–1996investment_returns27%fed LTCG 20-28% plus GA gains taxed as ordinary income at its 6% top bracket (no exclusion)dor.georgia.gov
الولايات المتحدة-GA1997–2012investment_returns20%fed LTCG 15-20% plus GA ordinary treatment of gains at 6%dor.georgia.gov
الولايات المتحدة-GA2013–2026investment_returns28%fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% plus GA ordinary treatment of gains across its 6% (2013-18), 5.75% (2019-20), and flat-tax glide down to 5.19% (2021-26) ratesdor.georgia.gov
US-OH2013–2026investment_returns27%fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% plus OH gains taxed as ordinary nonbusiness income across its top-bracket glide path, 4.797% (pre-2021) then 3.99%, 3.5% from 2024tax.ohio.gov
US-NC2012–2017investment_returns20%fed LTCG 15-20% plus NC gains taxed as ordinary income at its flat rate stepping from 5.75% to 5.499%ncdor.gov
US-NC2018–2026investment_returns27%fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% plus NC ordinary treatment of gains across its flat-rate glide path, 5.25% stepping down toward 3.99% by 2026ncdor.gov
US-PR2021–2026investment_returns18%Act 60 gives qualifying bona fide PR residents 0% on PR-source capital gains accrued after their move date; built-in gains from before the move stay federally taxable, so this blends full federal treatment on the pre-move and mainland-source share with 0% on the qualifying post-move sharehklaw.com
CA-BC2015–2026ordinary_creator_income50%federal top bracket 33% plus British Columbia's top provincial rate of 20.5% over $265,545 (2026 BC schedule) gives a combined top marginal near 53.5%, above Alberta's 48%; effective rate at high income taken just under the marginal, on the same basis as the CA-AB rowwww2.gov.bc.ca
CA-BC2015–2026investment_returns27%Canada includes only 50% of a capital gain in taxable income; the 2024 proposal to raise the inclusion rate to 66.67% was cancelled in March 2025 so it stayed at 50%; half of the about-53.5% BC combined top marginal applied to the taxable halfwww2.gov.bc.ca
US-NC1996–2002ordinary_creator_income50%NC top bracket about 7.75% before the 2014 flat-tax reform; federal effective blend plus the state top ratencdor.gov
US-NC2003–2011ordinary_creator_income45%NC top bracket about 7.75% before the 2014 flat-tax reform; federal effective blend plus the state top ratencdor.gov
US-NC1996–1996investment_returns33%NC top bracket about 7.75% before the 2014 flat-tax reform; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state ratencdor.gov
US-NC1997–2011investment_returns26%NC top bracket about 7.75% before the 2014 flat-tax reform; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state ratencdor.gov
الولايات المتحدة-أريزونا1984–1986ordinary_creator_income46%AZ graduated top bracket about 5.5% in this era; federal effective blend plus the state top rateazdor.gov
الولايات المتحدة-أريزونا1987–1987ordinary_creator_income41%AZ graduated top bracket about 5.5% in this era; federal effective blend plus the state top rateazdor.gov
الولايات المتحدة-أريزونا1988–1992ordinary_creator_income35%AZ graduated top bracket about 5.5% in this era; federal effective blend plus the state top rateazdor.gov
الولايات المتحدة-أريزونا1993–2002ordinary_creator_income47%AZ graduated top bracket about 5.5% in this era; federal effective blend plus the state top rateazdor.gov
الولايات المتحدة-أريزونا2003–2006ordinary_creator_income42%AZ graduated top bracket about 5.5% in this era; federal effective blend plus the state top rateazdor.gov
الولايات المتحدة-أريزونا1984–1996investment_returns30%AZ graduated top bracket about 5.5% in this era; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state rateazdor.gov
الولايات المتحدة-أريزونا1997–2006investment_returns23%AZ graduated top bracket about 5.5% in this era; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state rateazdor.gov
الولايات المتحدة-SC1975–1981ordinary_creator_income47%SC top bracket 7%; federal effective blend plus the state top ratedor.sc.gov
الولايات المتحدة-SC1975–1981investment_returns36%SC top bracket 7%; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state ratedor.sc.gov
الولايات المتحدة طن متري1975–1981ordinary_creator_income51%MT top bracket 11% in this era; federal effective blend plus the state top ratemtrevenue.gov
الولايات المتحدة طن متري1975–1981investment_returns40%MT top bracket 11% in this era; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state ratemtrevenue.gov
الولايات المتحدة-IL1986–1986ordinary_creator_income43%معدل الفائدة الثابت 2.5% ثم 3%، 5%، 3.75%، و4.95% من عام 2017؛ المزيج الفعال الفيدرالي بالإضافة إلى المعدل الأعلى للولايةإلينوي.gov
الولايات المتحدة-IL1987–1987ordinary_creator_income39%معدل الفائدة الثابت 2.5% ثم 3%، 5%، 3.75%، و4.95% من عام 2017؛ المزيج الفعال الفيدرالي بالإضافة إلى المعدل الأعلى للولايةإلينوي.gov
الولايات المتحدة-IL1988–1988ordinary_creator_income33%معدل الفائدة الثابت 2.5% ثم 3%، 5%، 3.75%، و4.95% من عام 2017؛ المزيج الفعال الفيدرالي بالإضافة إلى المعدل الأعلى للولايةإلينوي.gov
الولايات المتحدة-IL1989–1992ordinary_creator_income33%معدل الفائدة الثابت 2.5% ثم 3%، 5%، 3.75%، و4.95% من عام 2017؛ المزيج الفعال الفيدرالي بالإضافة إلى المعدل الأعلى للولايةإلينوي.gov
الولايات المتحدة-IL1993–2002ordinary_creator_income45%معدل الفائدة الثابت 2.5% ثم 3%، 5%، 3.75%، و4.95% من عام 2017؛ المزيج الفعال الفيدرالي بالإضافة إلى المعدل الأعلى للولايةإلينوي.gov
الولايات المتحدة-IL2003–2010ordinary_creator_income40%معدل الفائدة الثابت 2.5% ثم 3%، 5%، 3.75%، و4.95% من عام 2017؛ المزيج الفعال الفيدرالي بالإضافة إلى المعدل الأعلى للولايةإلينوي.gov
الولايات المتحدة-IL2011–2012ordinary_creator_income42%معدل الفائدة الثابت 2.5% ثم 3%، 5%، 3.75%، و4.95% من عام 2017؛ المزيج الفعال الفيدرالي بالإضافة إلى المعدل الأعلى للولايةإلينوي.gov
الولايات المتحدة-IL2013–2014ordinary_creator_income47%معدل الفائدة الثابت 2.5% ثم 3%، 5%، 3.75%، و4.95% من عام 2017؛ المزيج الفعال الفيدرالي بالإضافة إلى المعدل الأعلى للولايةإلينوي.gov
الولايات المتحدة-IL2015–2016ordinary_creator_income46%معدل الفائدة الثابت 2.5% ثم 3%، 5%، 3.75%، و4.95% من عام 2017؛ المزيج الفعال الفيدرالي بالإضافة إلى المعدل الأعلى للولايةإلينوي.gov
الولايات المتحدة-IL2017–2017ordinary_creator_income47%معدل الفائدة الثابت 2.5% ثم 3%، 5%، 3.75%، و4.95% من عام 2017؛ المزيج الفعال الفيدرالي بالإضافة إلى المعدل الأعلى للولايةإلينوي.gov
الولايات المتحدة-IL2018–2026ordinary_creator_income38%معدل الفائدة الثابت 2.5% ثم 3%، 5%، 3.75%، و4.95% من عام 2017؛ المزيج الفعال الفيدرالي بالإضافة إلى المعدل الأعلى للولايةإلينوي.gov
الولايات المتحدة-IL1986–1988investment_returns28%IL flat rate, 2.5% then 3%, 5%, 3.75%, and 4.95% from 2017; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state rateإلينوي.gov
الولايات المتحدة-IL1989–1996investment_returns28%IL flat rate, 2.5% then 3%, 5%, 3.75%, and 4.95% from 2017; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state rateإلينوي.gov
الولايات المتحدة-IL1997–2010investment_returns21%IL flat rate, 2.5% then 3%, 5%, 3.75%, and 4.95% from 2017; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state rateإلينوي.gov
الولايات المتحدة-IL2011–2012investment_returns23%IL flat rate, 2.5% then 3%, 5%, 3.75%, and 4.95% from 2017; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state rateإلينوي.gov
الولايات المتحدة-IL2013–2014investment_returns29%IL flat rate, 2.5% then 3%, 5%, 3.75%, and 4.95% from 2017; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state rateإلينوي.gov
الولايات المتحدة-IL2015–2016investment_returns28%IL flat rate, 2.5% then 3%, 5%, 3.75%, and 4.95% from 2017; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state rateإلينوي.gov
الولايات المتحدة-IL2017–2026investment_returns29%IL flat rate, 2.5% then 3%, 5%, 3.75%, and 4.95% from 2017; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state rateإلينوي.gov
US-NM2008–2012ordinary_creator_income42%NM top bracket 4.9% then 5.9% from 2021; federal effective blend plus the state top rateTax.newmexico.gov
US-NM2013–2017ordinary_creator_income47%NM top bracket 4.9% then 5.9% from 2021; federal effective blend plus the state top rateTax.newmexico.gov
US-NM2018–2020ordinary_creator_income38%NM top bracket 4.9% then 5.9% from 2021; federal effective blend plus the state top rateTax.newmexico.gov
US-NM2021–2026ordinary_creator_income39%NM top bracket 4.9% then 5.9% from 2021; federal effective blend plus the state top rateTax.newmexico.gov
US-NM2008–2012investment_returns23%NM top bracket 4.9% then 5.9% from 2021; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state rateTax.newmexico.gov
US-NM2013–2020investment_returns29%NM top bracket 4.9% then 5.9% from 2021; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state rateTax.newmexico.gov
US-NM2021–2026investment_returns30%NM top bracket 4.9% then 5.9% from 2021; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state rateTax.newmexico.gov
US-VA2001–2002ordinary_creator_income48%VA top bracket 5.75%; federal effective blend plus the state top ratetax.virginia.gov
US-VA2003–2012ordinary_creator_income43%VA top bracket 5.75%; federal effective blend plus the state top ratetax.virginia.gov
US-VA2013–2017ordinary_creator_income48%VA top bracket 5.75%; federal effective blend plus the state top ratetax.virginia.gov
US-VA2018–2026ordinary_creator_income39%VA top bracket 5.75%; federal effective blend plus the state top ratetax.virginia.gov
US-VA2001–2012investment_returns24%VA top bracket 5.75%; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state ratetax.virginia.gov
US-VA2013–2026investment_returns30%VA top bracket 5.75%; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state ratetax.virginia.gov
US-OR2013–2017ordinary_creator_income52%OR top bracket 9.9%, among the highest state rates; federal effective blend plus the state top rateoregon.gov
US-OR2018–2026ordinary_creator_income43%OR top bracket 9.9%, among the highest state rates; federal effective blend plus the state top rateoregon.gov
US-OR2013–2026investment_returns34%OR top bracket 9.9%, among the highest state rates; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state rateoregon.gov
US-NE2008–2012ordinary_creator_income44%NE top bracket 6.84% easing to 5.8%; federal effective blend plus the state top rateالإيرادات.nebraska.gov
US-NE2013–2017ordinary_creator_income49%NE top bracket 6.84% easing to 5.8%; federal effective blend plus the state top rateالإيرادات.nebraska.gov
US-NE2018–2022ordinary_creator_income40%NE top bracket 6.84% easing to 5.8%; federal effective blend plus the state top rateالإيرادات.nebraska.gov
US-NE2023–2026ordinary_creator_income39%NE top bracket 6.84% easing to 5.8%; federal effective blend plus the state top rateالإيرادات.nebraska.gov
US-NE2008–2012investment_returns25%NE top bracket 6.84% easing to 5.8%; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state rateالإيرادات.nebraska.gov
US-NE2013–2022investment_returns31%NE top bracket 6.84% easing to 5.8%; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state rateالإيرادات.nebraska.gov
US-NE2023–2026investment_returns30%NE top bracket 6.84% easing to 5.8%; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state rateالإيرادات.nebraska.gov
Monaco1970–2026ordinary_creator_income1%Monaco levies no personal income tax on residents (French nationals excepted); residents keep employment and endorsement income untaxed locallyen.service-public.mc
Monaco1970–2026investment_returns1%Monaco has no personal income tax and no capital gains tax for residents; near zero on a private portfolioen.service-public.mc
Italy2004–2026ordinary_creator_income43%Italy top national rate 43% plus regional and municipal surcharges, roughly 45-48% at high income; the flat-tax regime for new residents can lower the effective rate on foreign income, so this is a conservative salary-rate blendagenziaentrate.gov.it
Italy2004–2026investment_returns26%Italy taxes financial income at a 26% substitute rate on most capital gains and dividendsagenziaentrate.gov.it
PH1995–2017ordinary_creator_income30%Philippines top marginal 32-35% in this era; effective around 30% at high income after the graduated schedulebir.gov.ph
PH2018–2026ordinary_creator_income32%Philippines TRAIN law top rate 35% from 2018; effective around 32% at high incomebir.gov.ph
PH1995–2026investment_returns13%Philippines taxes listed-share gains at a small percentage tax and other capital gains at 6-15%, with a 10% dividend tax; blended low effectivebir.gov.ph
SA2009–2026ordinary_creator_income1%Saudi Arabia levies no individual income tax on employment income; a resident athlete's salary is untaxed locallyzatca.gov.sa
SA2009–2026investment_returns1%Saudi Arabia has no personal capital gains dividend or interest tax on an individual's own portfoliozatca.gov.sa
Brazil-PJ2001–2014ordinary_creator_income20%Brazilian income routed through a pessoa-juridica company is taxed near 20% effective via Simples or Lucro Presumido, well below the 27.5% personal top rategov.br
Brazil-PJ2001–2026investment_returns15%Brazil taxes equity capital gains at a flat 15% while dividends to the individual shareholder are exempt; blended low effectivegov.br
الولايات المتحدة-CT1952–1990ordinary_creator_income42%Connecticut had no broad income tax until 1991, so these years are federal-only effective at high incomeportal.ct.gov
الولايات المتحدة-CT1952–1990investment_returns27%Connecticut had no broad income tax before 1991; a narrow capital-gains and dividends tax applied from 1969, blended into a federal-mostly effectiveportal.ct.gov
CA-BC2008–2014ordinary_creator_income44%British Columbia combined federal and provincial top rate about 44% before the 2016 federal top-bracket risewww2.gov.bc.ca
CA-BC2008–2014investment_returns22%Canada includes only 50% of a capital gain in income; half of the about-44% pre-2016 BC combined top ratewww2.gov.bc.ca
Japan2015–2026investment_returns20%Japan taxes listed-equity capital gains and dividends at a flat 20.315% national+local separate taxation rate for most individual portfolios; blended ~20%nta.go.jp
Sweden2010–2026investment_returns30%Sweden taxes capital income (kapitalinkomst: gains, dividends, interest) at a flat 30%skatteverket.se
IE2008–2014ordinary_creator_income48%Ireland top rate 41% plus USC and PRSI through the pre-2015 era; effective ~48% at high self-employed incomerevenue.ie
IE2008–2014investment_returns30%Ireland CGT 30% (raised from 25% in 2012) plus DIRT on deposit interest; blended ~30% on a diversified portfoliorevenue.ie
CH1990–2003ordinary_creator_income22%same Schwyz-area low-tax commune schedule extended backward; Swiss federal+cantonal structure was stable for high earners in low-tax cantonsTaxsummaries.pwc.com
CH1990–2003investment_returns10%Swiss capital gains on private movable assets largely untaxed at federal level; modest cantonal wealth-tax drag approximatedTaxsummaries.pwc.com
BR2009–2016ordinary_creator_income27%personal progressive schedule tops out at 27.5%; same personal-schedule logic as the 2017+ rows for club-salaried athletesgov.br
BR2009–2016investment_returns17%equity capital gains near 15% with progressive bands on other gains; blended effective on a 60/40 total returngov.br
US-OR2000–2012ordinary_creator_income48%OR top bracket near 9-9.9% across this era; federal effective blend plus the state top rateoregon.gov
US-OR2000–2012investment_returns32%OR taxes gains as ordinary income at the state rate; federal LTCG blend plus OR top rateoregon.gov
Spain1995–2006ordinary_creator_income45%Spanish IRPF top marginal was high-40s in this era; effective blend at high athletic income ~45%agenciatributaria.es
Spain1995–2006investment_returns25%capital gains and savings tax blend for high earners in the pre-2010 IRPF structureagenciatributaria.es
JM2000–2007ordinary_creator_income25%pre-2008 PAYE top rate near 25% flat for high earners; effective close to headlineTaxsummaries.pwc.com
JM2000–2007investment_returns13%no CGT regime; dividend/interest withholding keeps a modest blend on a 60/40 total returnTaxsummaries.pwc.com

Spending, through the savings curve

Savings rates by income
After-tax income bracketSavedStudySource
middle_quintile11%Dynan Skinner Zeldes 2004 JPE (SCF-based median saving rates rise with income)piketty.pse.ens.fr
top_quintile24%Dynan Skinner Zeldes 2004 JPEpiketty.pse.ens.fr
top_5_percent37%Dynan Skinner Zeldes 2004 JPEpiketty.pse.ens.fr
top_1_percent51%Dynan Skinner Zeldes 2004 JPEpiketty.pse.ens.fr
above_2M_extrapolated65%extrapolation beyond DSZ top 1% following monotonic income-savings trend; assumption disclosedextrapolation
the top bracket is an extrapolation above the study’s range and is marked as such in the engine

Investment returns

60/40 benchmark, actual calendar-year total returns
YearS&amp;P 500 TRUS Agg bonds60/40 blendSource
1984+6.3%+15.2%+9.8%slickcharts.com
1985+31.7%+22.1%+27.9%slickcharts.com
1986+18.7%+15.3%+17.3%slickcharts.com
1987+5.2%+2.8%+4.2%slickcharts.com
1988+16.6%+7.9%+13.1%slickcharts.com
1989+31.7%+14.5%+24.8%slickcharts.com
1990-3.1%+9.0%+1.7%slickcharts.com
1991+30.5%+16.0%+24.7%slickcharts.com
1992+7.6%+7.4%+7.5%slickcharts.com
1993+10.1%+9.8%+10.0%slickcharts.com
1994+1.3%-2.9%-0.4%slickcharts.com
1995+37.6%+18.5%+29.9%slickcharts.com
1996+23.0%+3.6%+15.2%slickcharts.com
1997+33.4%+9.7%+23.9%slickcharts.com
1998+28.6%+8.7%+20.6%slickcharts.com
1999+21.0%-0.8%+12.3%slickcharts.com
2000-9.1%+11.6%-0.8%slickcharts.com
2001-11.9%+8.4%-3.8%slickcharts.com
2002-22.1%+10.2%-9.2%slickcharts.com
2003+28.7%+4.1%+18.9%slickcharts.com
2004+10.9%+4.3%+8.3%slickcharts.com
2005+4.9%+2.4%+3.9%slickcharts.com
2006+15.8%+4.3%+11.2%slickcharts.com
2007+5.5%+7.0%+6.1%slickcharts.com
2008-37.0%+5.2%-20.1%slickcharts.com
2009+26.5%+5.9%+18.2%slickcharts.com
2010+15.1%+6.5%+11.7%slickcharts.com
2011+2.1%+7.8%+4.4%slickcharts.com
2012+16.0%+4.2%+11.3%slickcharts.com
2013+32.4%-2.0%+18.6%slickcharts.com
2014+13.7%+6.0%+10.6%slickcharts.com
2015+1.4%+0.5%+1.1%slickcharts.com
2016+12.0%+2.6%+8.2%slickcharts.com
2017+21.8%+3.5%+14.5%slickcharts.com
2018-4.4%+0.0%-2.6%slickcharts.com
2019+31.5%+8.7%+22.4%slickcharts.com
2020+18.4%+7.5%+14.0%slickcharts.com
2021+28.7%-1.5%+16.6%slickcharts.com
2022-18.1%-13.0%-16.1%slickcharts.com
2023+26.3%+5.5%+18.0%slickcharts.com
2024+25.0%+1.2%+15.5%slickcharts.com
2025+17.9%+7.3%+13.7%rbcwealthmanagement.com
2026+0.0%+0.0%+0.0%slickcharts.com
2026 is held at 0% until the year ends

Business valuation multiples

Comparable transactions
Business typeCompYearMultipleNotesSource
newsletter_mediaMorning Brew / Insider majority20203.75x$75M valuation on ~$20M 2020 revenue; majority all-cashaxios.com
newsletter_mediaThe Hustle / HubSpot20212.5xreported ~$27M ($17.2M net per HubSpot 10-K) on est ~$10M+ revenuesec.gov
creator_media_networkTheorist Media / Lunar X20223.0xundisclosed; industry estimates $40-60M; our derived ~3x on ~$9M revenuetubefilter.com
auction_marketplaceCars & Bids / The Chernin Group majority20236.0x$37M for majority implies ~$62M on est ~$10M annual commission revenuetubefilter.com
creator_brand_platformDude Perfect / Highmount growth round20244.0x$100-300M committed; company-stated revenue >$50M; minority growth capitalaxios.com
subscription_boxBARK (BarkBox) SPAC20214.4x$1.6B on $365M FY21 revenue at SPAC peak; later compressed to ~0.5-1x in public trading (use compressed end for private sub-box)retaildive.com
auction_marketplaceCars & Bids combined entity (per Doug DeMuro on My First Million #456 title)2023n/axpodcast title states company sold for $80M; corroborates our $61.7M implied floorlinkedin.com

Music stream payouts

Per-stream payouts to rights holders
PlatformYearPer streamBasisSource
spotify2024$0.0035aggregate $0.003-0.005 per stream to rights holders (midpoint low); premium higher than ad-tierchartlex.com
spotify2024$0.7000structural: 70% of revenue to rights holders (70/30 split); 1000-stream royalty floor since Apr 2024 (row = share not per-stream)artists.spotify.com
apple_music2021$0.0100Apple artist letter: averages one penny per stream (as reported; verify URL)wsj.com
distrokid_distribution2026$1.0000self-released via flat-fee distributor keeps 100% of royalties (annual fee ~$25); engine uses 0.85 artist share after typical producer/collaborator splits (assumption)distrokid.com
label_deal_artist_share2026$0.2000typical major-label artist royalty 15-25% of receipts (midpoint); PENDING SOURCEافتراض
the artist keeps a share of this depending on their deal; unknown deals get the label-deal share, and platforms other than Spotify are estimated separately

Estimated lanes

Lanes without direct measurement are estimated rather than zeroed. Merchandise uses sourced print-on-demand benchmarks: 0.5% of engaged fans buying one drop a year at a $25 order, at sourced margins. Streaming royalties beyond Spotify are estimated by scaling the measured Spotify royalties to the whole market, since Spotify holds 32.2% of global music subscribers. Shorts views from before YouTube switched on revenue sharing are priced at the Fund-era floor rate. Channel memberships are estimated wherever a channel has them enabled. Instagram and TikTok brand posts are estimated from a channel’s reach at sourced per-post rates, six paid posts a year, capped at 30% of its YouTube revenue. The benchmark table below publishes every one of these rates with its source, and rows marked as assumptions say so. Real estate enters where a purchase is on record and appreciates at its metro Case-Shiller rate, and a business stake enters where a real transaction fixes its value. Art collections are the remaining lane we are building out.

How we estimate actors

Every actor page runs on the same discipline. A film role earns one of four things. A disclosed salary and documented backend, entered as reported with a citation. For undisclosed lead roles after an actor’s breakthrough, the median of disclosed salaries for that era and budget band (six bands from micro-budget under $5M through blockbusters at $200M and up), blended with the actor’s own disclosed quote history when we have it, floored at 70% of their recent personal max, and capped at 15% of the film’s budget (or at the actor’s proven personal max when that history exists, never above half the budget). Fees that are clearly non-market (union scale, far below a co-star, charity rates) stay on that person’s page as disclosed but are kept out of the median cells so they do not drag every peer down. For supporting roles after breakthrough, a documented fraction of the same lead cell: about 12%, because an established star’s supporting part is not a pre-stardom bit role. And for roles before the breakthrough, the pre-stardom ratio: across the disclosed deals in our table signed by actors who were not yet stars, from Stallone’s $35,000 for Rocky to DiCaprio’s $2.5M upfront for Titanic, the median deal paid about 2.5% of its era’s going lead rate. Films with no reported budget are treated as small productions. Every role is estimated; a role would only enter at zero if someone documented that it was played for free. Documented non-film income enters as dated rows with citations: Friends salaries season by season, Tulsa King at its reported per-episode fees, a Dior partnership at its reported minimum. Representation fees, taxes by era, the savings curve, and real benchmark returns then run exactly as they do for creators, with one addition: where court filings document actual spending, the filings replace the curve.

Three more lanes are estimated rather than zeroed. Undocumented backend enters as an expected value: across our disclosed lead deals, about 12% included points, at a median share of box office, so undisclosed post-breakthrough lead roles carry that expected value against their box office, and films whose points are documented but unquantified carry the median rate directly. A disclosed total that already includes backend is never stacked with another backend estimate. When theatrical box office is missing, residuals and backend expected value use production budget times two as a receipts proxy. Endorsements enter as the number of brand partnerships times a per-brand annual fee and term. For film actors that fee is the median disclosed ambassador deal in the endorsement table below, scaled to the actor’s own quote versus the era median so a mid-tier career is not priced like a Lancome global ambassadorship. Athletes and creators use a modeled per-brand rate, because the endorsement deals reported for them are almost all megastar outliers, and anyone whose own deal is public enters at that reported figure. Producer, director, and writer credits enter at a union-scale floor per credit, scaled to each era. Residuals are estimated from SAG residual rates applied to assumed post-theatrical receipts, split by role and spread over the decade after release. Named TV runs, Broadway engagements, and art sales enter through cited per-person rows. Real estate enters where a purchase is documented and appreciates at its metro rate, and a business stake enters where a real transaction fixes its value; art collections are the remaining lane we are building out.

Multi-decade careers forced two accumulation rules the creator pages never needed. First, the savings rate is capped at 51%, the top bracket the Dynan–Skinner–Zeldes study actually measured; the higher figure in our table is a disclosed extrapolation, and compounding an extrapolation across 40 years would let one assumption dominate the page. Second, portfolio returns are taxed at sourced capital-gains blends for each era before they compound, because untaxed compounding roughly doubled the oldest careers against every known reference point. Documented one-off liabilities also enter with citations, like the reported $90 million Willis–Moore divorce settlement. UK-filed companies are checked against the register exactly as on creator pages: Jason Statham’s and Emma Watson’s production companies file publicly, and both sit far below the model, which the pages report as documented floors rather than additions.

The Depp pilot doubles as a backtest. His former managers’ court records put his 2003–2016 earnings near $650 million. The model, built from film pay and the estimated lanes above, lands under that court-documented total for the same window, and his page reports the exact share along with which lanes hold the rest. A floor that lands under a court-documented total, for documented reasons, is the model behaving.

Two more accumulation choices matter on multi-decade pages. Entertainment households are modeled as saving a bit less of after-tax income than the plain SCF top bracket at the same cash level, unless a court filing replaces the curve. Unmarked savings then compound on a mixed path: a little over half at the actual 60/40 securities return (taxed), the rest at the long-run US home-price rate, because real careers hold more property and private assets than a pure brokerage glide path. TV series with a config credit enter through a per-episode comps table when the fee is not disclosed. We publish one central estimate on each page, not a range.

Disclosed film salaries
ActorFilmYearPayWhat was disclosedSource
Dustin HoffmanTootsie1982$5,500,000 upfrontreported $5.5M, the salary that reset the top of the market at a time when top salaries ran $2-3Mscreenrant.com (مجمع)
Bruce WillisDie Hard1988$5,000,000 upfrontreported $5M, controversial at the time as TV-star money matching established film leadsscreenrant.com (مجمع)
Jim CarreyThe Cable Guy199620.000.000 دولار مقدماfirst $20M upfront comedy salary plus 15% backend (backend amount not separately reported)Variety.com (الصحافة التجارية)
Leonardo DiCaprioTitanic1997$2,500,000 upfront, $37,500,000 backend$2.5M upfront (pre-stardom casting) plus negotiated 1.8% of gross; total widely reported ~$40M as the film passed $2Byahoo.com (يضعط)
Julia RobertsErin Brockovich200020.000.000 دولار مقدماfirst $20M salary for an actress, widely covered milestonehistory.com (يضعط)
Leonardo DiCaprioThe Beach200020.000.000 دولار مقدماpost-Titanic $20M quote, widely reportedyahoo.com (يضعط)
Johnny DeppPirates of the Caribbean: The Curse of the Black Pearl200310.000.000 دولار مقدماreported $10M for the first filmscreenrant.com (مجمع)
Sandra BullockMiss Congeniality 2: Armed and Fabulous2005$17,500,000 upfrontreported $17.5MParade.com (مجمع)
Johnny DeppPirates of the Caribbean: Dead Man's Chest2006$20,000,000 upfront, $40,000,000 backend$20M base with backend taking the film's total to a reported $60Mscreenrant.com (مجمع)
Johnny DeppPirates of the Caribbean: At World's End2007$50,000,000 totalreported $50M total for the third film (upfront/backend split not reported)screenrant.com (مجمع)
Sandra BullockThe Blind Side200920.000.000 دولار مقدماreported ~$20M with backend participation on top (backend not separately quantified)Parade.com (مجمع)
Johnny DeppAlice in Wonderland2010$50,000,000 totalreported ~$50M total, heavily backend-weightedfaroutmagazine.co.uk (مجمع)
Johnny DeppPirates of the Caribbean: On Stranger Tides2011$35,000,000 upfront, $20,000,000 backend$35M base plus $20M in bonuses, reported ~14.5% of the film's record budgetscreenrant.com (مجمع)
Sandra BullockGravity2013$20,000,000 upfront, $50,000,000 backendTHR exclusive: $20M upfront against 15% of first-dollar gross; total reported at least $70M across streamshollywoodreporter.com (الصحافة التجارية)
Leonardo DiCaprioThe Revenant201520.000.000 دولار مقدماreported $20Mtherichest.com (مجمع)
Jennifer LawrencePassengers201620.000.000 دولار مقدماreported $20M, widely covered at the timeindiewire.com (الصحافة التجارية)
Johnny DeppPirates of the Caribbean: Dead Men Tell No Tales2017$90,000,000 totalreported ~$90M total for the fifth film incl. backendscreenrant.com (مجمع)
Robert Downey Jr.المنتقمون: نهاية اللعبة2019$20,000,000 upfront, $55,000,000 backendForbes: $20M upfront plus ~$55M backend from an 8% first-dollar-type deal, $75M totalindiewire.com (الصحافة التجارية)
Leonardo DiCaprioDon't Look Up2021$30,000,000 upfrontVariety: $30M streaming salary (Lawrence $25M on the same film)Variety.com (الصحافة التجارية)
Jennifer LawrenceDon't Look Up2021$25,000,000 upfrontVariety: $25M streaming salaryVariety.com (الصحافة التجارية)
Leonardo DiCaprioKillers of the Flower Moon2023$30,000,000 upfrontreported $30M (some later reports put it at $40M; earlier trade figure used and the range is noted)screenrant.com (مجمع)
Leonardo DiCaprioOne Battle After Another202520.000.000 دولار مقدماreported $20M for the Paul Thomas Anderson filmVariety.com (الصحافة التجارية)
Sandra BullockSpeed1994$500,000 upfrontreported $500k, pre-stardom castingParade.com (مجمع)
Sandra BullockSpeed 2: Cruise Control1997$10,500,000 upfrontreported $10.5MParade.com (مجمع)
Scarlett JohanssonBlack Widow202120.000.000 دولار مقدماDisney's public response to her release-window lawsuit confirmed a $20M salaryVariety.com (first-party statement)
Scarlett Johanssonالمنتقمون: حرب إنفينيتي201815.000.000 دولار مقدماreported $15M for each of the last two Avengers filmsscreenrant.com (مجمع)
Scarlett Johanssonالمنتقمون: نهاية اللعبة2019$15,000,000 upfront, $20,000,000 backendreported $15M upfront, around $35M once bonuses landedcinemablend.com (يضعط)
Scarlett JohanssonGhost in the Shell2017$17,500,000 upfrontreported $17.5M, her career-high upfront at the timeParade.com (مجمع)
Margot RobbieBarbie2023$12,500,000 upfront, $37,500,000 backendVariety: $12.5M salary with box office bonuses taking the total to roughly $50MVariety.com (الصحافة التجارية)
Emma WatsonHarry Potter and the Deathly Hallows - PT1201015.000.000 دولار مقدماreported $30M combined for the two final filmsscreenrant.com (مجمع)
Emma WatsonHarry Potter and the Deathly Hallows - PT2201115.000.000 دولار مقدماreported $30M combined for the two final filmsscreenrant.com (مجمع)
Emma WatsonBeauty and the Beast2017$3,000,000 upfront, $12,000,000 backendTHR: $3M upfront, escalating to $15M on Maleficent-level box office, which it hithollywoodreporter.com (الصحافة التجارية)
Tom HanksForrest Gump1994$62,500,000 backendtook gross points instead of a salary; Entertainment Weekly put the return at $60M, IndieWire at $65M, midpoint bookedindiewire.com (الصحافة التجارية)
Tom HanksSaving Private Ryan1998$37,500,000 totalreported $30-40M from fee plus backend, midpoint bookeden.wikipedia.org (مجمع)
Tom HanksToy Story1995$50,000 upfrontreported $50K voice fee, per the Los Angeles TimesParade.com (مجمع)
Julia RobertsSteel Magnolias1989$90,000 upfrontreported $90K, per the Los Angeles TimesParade.com (مجمع)
Julia RobertsPretty Woman1990$300,000 upfrontreported $300K, per the Los Angeles Times; pre-stardom castingParade.com (مجمع)
Julia RobertsFlatliners1990$550,000 upfrontreported $550K, per the Los Angeles TimesParade.com (مجمع)
Julia RobertsSleeping with the Enemy1991$1,000,000 upfrontreported $1M, per the Los Angeles Times; contracted before Pretty Woman openedParade.com (مجمع)
Julia RobertsMona Lisa Smile2003$25,000,000 upfrontreported $25M, then the record salary for an actressParade.com (مجمع)
Julia RobertsValentine's Day2010$3,000,000 upfrontreported $3M for six minutes of screen time, per VarietyParade.com (مجمع)
Julia RobertsMother's Day2016$3,000,000 upfrontreported $3M, per VarietyParade.com (مجمع)
Bruce WillisThe Sixth Sense1999$14,000,000 upfront, $86,000,000 backend$14M fee plus 17.5% of profits; total reported around $100Mcheatsheet.com (يضعط)
Angelina JolieLara Croft: Tomb Raider2001$7,000,000 upfrontreported $7MParade.com (مجمع)
Angelina JolieLara Croft: Tomb Raider, Cradle of Life2003$12,000,000 upfrontreported $12MParade.com (مجمع)
Angelina JolieMr. & Mrs. Smith200510.000.000 دولار مقدماأُبلغ عن 10 ملايين دولارParade.com (مجمع)
Angelina JolieWanted200815.000.000 دولار مقدماreported $15MParade.com (مجمع)
Angelina JolieSalt201020.000.000 دولار مقدماreported $20M plus a percentage of grossfilmindustry.network (مجمع)
Angelina JolieThe Tourist2010$19,000,000 upfrontreported $19Mfilmindustry.network (مجمع)
Matt DamonThe Bourne Identity200210.000.000 دولار مقدماأُبلغ عن 10 ملايين دولارetonline.com (يضعط)
Matt DamonThe Bourne Supremacy2004$26,000,000 upfrontreported $26Metonline.com (يضعط)
Matt DamonThe Bourne Ultimatum2007$26,000,000 upfrontreported $26Metonline.com (يضعط)
Matt DamonThe Martian2015$25,000,000 upfrontreported $25MParade.com (مجمع)
Matt DamonJason Bourne2016$25,000,000 upfrontreported $25Metonline.com (يضعط)
Christian BaleBatman Begins2005$9,000,000 upfrontreported $9MParade.com (مجمع)
Christian BaleThe Dark Knight2008$10,000,000 upfront, $20,000,000 backend$10M base plus a reported $20M performance bonusParade.com (مجمع)
Christian Baleفارس الظلام يرتفع201215.000.000 دولار مقدماreported $15MParade.com (مجمع)
Hugh JackmanX-Men2000$500,000 upfrontreported $500K, unknown-actor castingscreenrant.com (مجمع)
Hugh JackmanVan Helsing2004$2,000,000 upfrontreported $2Mtherichest.com (مجمع)
Hugh JackmanAustralia200810.000.000 دولار مقدماأُبلغ عن 10 ملايين دولارtherichest.com (مجمع)
Hugh JackmanReal Steel2011$9,000,000 upfrontreported $9Mtherichest.com (مجمع)
Hugh JackmanDeadpool & Wolverine202420.000.000 دولار مقدماreported $20Mwegotthiscovered.com (مجمع)
Jodie FosterAnna and the King199915.000.000 دولار مقدماVariety, 1998: a $15M fee, her biggest to dateVariety.com (الصحافة التجارية)
Sylvester StalloneRocky1976$35,000 upfront, $2,465,000 backendhis own account to Variety: $35K upfront for writing and starring, 10 net points, about $2.5M in allVariety.com (الصحافة التجارية)
Sylvester StalloneFirst Blood1982$3,500,000 upfrontmost reports put it at $3.5M (some say $7M); lower figure bookedParade.com (مجمع)
Sylvester StalloneRambo III1988$16,000,000 upfrontreported $16M upfront, then among the highest salaries evercbr.com (مجمع)
Sylvester StalloneCop Land1997$60,000 totalworked for SAG scale, a reported $1,813 a week, roughly $60K across the shoottampabay.com (مجمع)
Sylvester StalloneDriven200120.000.000 دولار مقدماreported $20M, one of his two highest paydaysParade.com (مجمع)
Sylvester StalloneD-Tox200220.000.000 دولار مقدماreported $20M (released as Eye See You), one of his two highest paydaysParade.com (مجمع)
Jason StathamFast & Furious Presents: Hobbs & Shaw2019$13,000,000 upfrontreported $13M plus EP creditsupercarblondie.com (مجمع)
Dwayne JohnsonFast & Furious Presents: Hobbs & Shaw201920.000.000 دولار مقدماreported $20M upfrontsupercarblondie.com (مجمع)
Jason StathamMeg 2: The Trench2023$25,000,000 upfrontreported $25Mkoimoi.com (مجمع)
Jason StathamThe Beekeeper2024$25,000,000 upfrontreported $25Mimdb.com (مجمع)
Natalie Portmanثور: الحب والرعد2022$1,200,000 upfrontshe revealed a $1.2M fee, far below her co-star'sfandomwire.com (first-party statement)
آنا دي أرماسGhosted2023$3,000,000 totalreported $2-5M for the Apple film, middle of the range usedfandomwire.com (مجمع)
Jim CarreyLiar Liar199720.000.000 دولار مقدماreported $20MParade.com (مجمع)
Demi MooreStriptease1996$12,500,000 upfrontthe then-unprecedented $12.5M that made her the highest-paid actressdeadline.com (الصحافة التجارية)
Chris PrattJurassic World: Fallen Kingdom201810.000.000 دولار مقدماأُبلغ عن 10 ملايين دولارscreenrant.com (مجمع)
Julia RobertsLeave the World Behind2023$25,000,000 totalVariety: $25M for the Netflix filmVariety.com (الصحافة التجارية)
Tom HanksThe Polar Express2004$40,000,000 upfront, $60,000,000 backendLos Angeles Times: $40M plus 20% of first-dollar gross, an estimated $100M totalParade.com (مجمع)
Sylvester StalloneRocky III1982$120,000 upfronthis own account: $120K upfront plus back-end points (points not separately quantified)Parade.com (مجمع)
Sylvester StalloneCreed201510.000.000 دولار مقدماأُبلغ عن 10 ملايين دولارParade.com (مجمع)
Sylvester StalloneThe Suicide Squad2021$3,000,000 upfrontreported $3M for the King Shark voice roleParade.com (مجمع)
Angelina JolieEternals2021$35,000,000 totalreported at more than $35M, her heftiest paycheckParade.com (مجمع)
Jennifer AnistonWe're the Millers2013$5,000,000 upfrontTHR's 2013 Money Issue: $5Mhollywoodreporter.com (الصحافة التجارية)
Tom CruiseTop Gun1986$2,000,000 upfrontreported $2M flat fee for the breakout lead rolescreenrant.com (مجمع)
Tom CruiseMission: Impossible1996$70,000,000 totaldeferred his salary for 22 percent of gross with 100 percent video accounting; Epstein reports the deal earned him more than $70Mslate.com (مجمع)
Tom CruiseMission: Impossible 22000$92,000,000 totalthe renegotiated 30 percent-of-gross deal with a doubled video royalty; Epstein puts his share at $92Mslate.com (مجمع)
Tom CruiseWar of the Worlds2005$100,000,000 totalwaived his upfront fee for a reported 20 percent of first-dollar gross, about $100M all-inen.wikipedia.org (مجمع)
Tom CruiseTop Gun: Maverick2022$12,500,000 upfront, $87,500,000 backend$12.5M upfront plus over 10 percent of first-dollar gross; Forbes projects more than $100M all-inفوربس.كوم (يضعط)
Eddie Murphy48 Hrs.1982$450,000 upfrontreported $450K for his film debut; Murphy himself has put it at $200Kyahoo.com (يضعط)
Eddie MurphyTrading Places1983$350,000 upfrontMurphy's own stated $350Kyahoo.com (يضعط)
Eddie MurphyBeverly Hills Cop1984$14,500,000 totalrenegotiated profit participation before release; total reported at $14.5Myahoo.com (يضعط)
Eddie MurphyBeverly Hills Cop II1987$8,000,000 upfrontreported $8M feeyahoo.com (يضعط)
Eddie MurphyComing to America1988$8,000,000 upfrontreported $8M plus 15 percent of rentalsyahoo.com (يضعط)
Eddie MurphyBeverly Hills Cop III199415.000.000 دولار مقدماreported $15M feeyahoo.com (يضعط)
Eddie MurphyThe Nutty Professor1996$16,000,000 upfrontreported $16M fee for the comeback roleyahoo.com (يضعط)
Eddie MurphyNutty Professor II: The Klumps2000$20,000,000 upfront, $40,000,000 backend$20M plus 20 percent of gross receipts, reported to total over $60Myahoo.com (يضعط)
Eddie MurphyDr. Dolittle 2200120.000.000 دولار مقدماreported $20M feeyahoo.com (يضعط)
Eddie MurphyThe Adventures of Pluto Nash200220.000.000 دولار مقدماreported $20M fee on one of the biggest flops ever madeyahoo.com (يضعط)
Eddie MurphyMulan1998$14,000,000 totalreported $14-20M for the Mushu voice role, unconfirmed; entered at the low endyahoo.com (يضعط)
Eddie MurphyShrek2001$3,000,000 totaldeferred $350K plus a share of domestic gross that Variety computed at about $3Mabcnews.go.com (مجمع)
Eddie MurphyShrek 22004$10,000,000 totalreported $10M for the sequel after the cast renegotiatedabcnews.go.com (مجمع)
Eddie MurphyShrek the Third2007$10,000,000 totalreported $10-12M range, entered at the low endyahoo.com (يضعط)
Eddie MurphyShrek Forever After2010$8,000,000 totalreported $4M upfront plus points, with totals reported up to $12M; entered at the midpointyahoo.com (يضعط)
Eddie MurphyBeverly Hills Cop: Axel F2024$20,000,000 totalDeadline reported a $20M fee, possibly upwards of $30M, within the film's $150M Netflix budgetscreenrant.com (مجمع)
Adam SandlerHappy Gilmore1996$2,000,000 upfrontreported $2M feelooper.com (مجمع)
Adam SandlerAnger Management200320.000.000 دولار مقدماصفقة Sony القياسية عبارة عن مستندات مقتطفات من كتاب منشور من THR: 20 مليون دولار مقابل 20 بالمائة من الإجماليhollywoodreporter.com (الصحافة التجارية)
Adam Sandler50 First Dates200420.000.000 دولار مقدماصفقة Sony القياسية عبارة عن مستندات مقتطفات من كتاب منشور من THR: 20 مليون دولار مقابل 20 بالمائة من الإجماليhollywoodreporter.com (الصحافة التجارية)
Adam SandlerSpanglish200420.000.000 دولار مقدماصفقة Sony القياسية عبارة عن مستندات مقتطفات من كتاب منشور من THR: 20 مليون دولار مقابل 20 بالمائة من الإجماليhollywoodreporter.com (الصحافة التجارية)
Adam SandlerClick200620.000.000 دولار مقدماصفقة Sony القياسية عبارة عن مستندات مقتطفات من كتاب منشور من THR: 20 مليون دولار مقابل 20 بالمائة من الإجماليhollywoodreporter.com (الصحافة التجارية)
Adam SandlerYou Don't Mess with the Zohan200820.000.000 دولار مقدماصفقة Sony القياسية عبارة عن مستندات مقتطفات من كتاب منشور من THR: 20 مليون دولار مقابل 20 بالمائة من الإجماليhollywoodreporter.com (الصحافة التجارية)
Adam SandlerGrown Ups201020.000.000 دولار مقدماصفقة Sony القياسية عبارة عن مستندات مقتطفات من كتاب منشور من THR: 20 مليون دولار مقابل 20 بالمائة من الإجماليhollywoodreporter.com (الصحافة التجارية)
Adam SandlerJust Go with It201120.000.000 دولار مقدماصفقة Sony القياسية عبارة عن مستندات مقتطفات من كتاب منشور من THR: 20 مليون دولار مقابل 20 بالمائة من الإجماليhollywoodreporter.com (الصحافة التجارية)
Adam SandlerJack and Jill201120.000.000 دولار مقدماصفقة Sony القياسية عبارة عن مستندات مقتطفات من كتاب منشور من THR: 20 مليون دولار مقابل 20 بالمائة من الإجماليhollywoodreporter.com (الصحافة التجارية)
Adam SandlerThat's My Boy201220.000.000 دولار مقدماصفقة Sony القياسية عبارة عن مستندات مقتطفات من كتاب منشور من THR: 20 مليون دولار مقابل 20 بالمائة من الإجماليhollywoodreporter.com (الصحافة التجارية)
Adam SandlerGrown Ups 2201320.000.000 دولار مقدماصفقة Sony القياسية عبارة عن مستندات مقتطفات من كتاب منشور من THR: 20 مليون دولار مقابل 20 بالمائة من الإجماليhollywoodreporter.com (الصحافة التجارية)
Adam SandlerPixels2015$5,000,000 upfronttook only $5M upfront in exchange for a bigger cut of the profits, per the THR-published book excerpthollywoodreporter.com (الصحافة التجارية)
Macaulay CulkinUncle Buck1989$40,000 upfrontreported $40Kaol.com (مجمع)
Macaulay CulkinHome Alone1990$110,000 upfrontreported $110K for the role that made him the biggest child star in film historyaol.com (مجمع)
Macaulay CulkinHome Alone 2: Lost in New York1992$4,500,000 upfronthis own account: $4.5M, the record for a child actor, plus 15 percent of merchandisingcollider.com (مجمع)
Macaulay CulkinRichie Rich1994$8,000,000 upfrontreported $8Maol.com (مجمع)
Brad PittOcean's Eleven200110.000.000 دولار مقدماreported $10M upfront for Ocean's Eleventheguardian.com (يضعط)
Brad PittWorld War Z201320.000.000 دولار مقدماreported $20M against backend for World War Zhollywoodreporter.com (الصحافة التجارية)
Will SmithMen in Black 3201220.000.000 دولار مقدماreported $20M+ for Men in Black 3فوربس.كوم (يضعط)
Will SmithSuicide Squad201620.000.000 دولار مقدماreported near $20M for Deadshot in Suicide Squadفوربس.كوم (يضعط)
Dwayne JohnsonJumanji: Welcome to the Jungle201720.000.000 دولار مقدماreported $20M for Jumanji: Welcome to the Jungleفوربس.كوم (يضعط)
Dwayne JohnsonRed Notice202120.000.000 دولار مقدماreported $20M for Red Noticeفوربس.كوم (يضعط)
Robert Downey Jr.Iron Man2008$500,000 upfrontearly MCU comeback deal reported near $500K upfront before backend participation on later filmshollywoodreporter.com (الصحافة التجارية)
George ClooneyOcean's Eleven200110.000.000 دولار مقدماreported $10M for Ocean's Eleventheguardian.com (يضعط)
Tom Hollandالرجل العنكبوت: لا طريق للمنزل202110.000.000 دولار مقدماreported mid-eight-figures; entered at $10M upfront floor for No Way Homeفوربس.كوم (يضعط)
Chris Hemsworthثور: الحب والرعد202215.000.000 دولار مقدماreported mid-teen millions for Thor: Love and Thunderفوربس.كوم (يضعط)
Chris PrattGuardians of the Galaxy Vol. 3202315.000.000 دولار مقدماreported mid-teen millions for Guardians Vol. 3فوربس.كوم (يضعط)
Keanu ReevesJohn Wick: Chapter 4202315.000.000 دولار مقدماreported mid-teen millions for John Wick Chapter 4فوربس.كوم (يضعط)
Harrison FordIndiana Jones and the Dial of Destiny202310.000.000 دولار مقدماreported eight-figure deal for Dial of Destiny; entered at $10M floorفوربس.كوم (يضعط)
established-lead rows with a separately reported upfront feed the era x budget-band median cells; pre-stardom rows and backend-heavy totals are used only for their own actor’s page, never in a cell. Every source carries its class label; the sourcing hierarchy below explains how we weigh them

Endorsement fee disclosures

Endorsement fee disclosures
WhoBrandYearAnnual feeTermWhat was disclosedSource
Charlize TheronRaymond Weil2005$2,571,429/yr1.2 yr$3M for an exclusive watch-ambassador term October 2005 to December 2006, stated in the breach-of-contract court record (Raymond Weil v. Theron, S.D.N.Y. 2008)caselaw.findlaw.com
Julia RobertsLancome2010$10,000,000/yr5 yr$50M five-year global ambassador deal, reported by WWD and trade pressluxurydaily.com
Nicole KidmanChanel No. 52004$4,000,000/yr3 yrabout $4M a year for a three-year global TV and print campaign with a renewal option, per WWDwwd.com
Brad PittChanel No. 52012$7,000,000/yr1 yrreported $7M fee for the first male No. 5 campaign, industry sources via Fashionistafashionista.com
Caitlin ClarkNike2024$3,500,000/yr8 yrNike signature deal reported at about $28M over eight years ($3.5M/yr)فوربس.كوم
LeBron JamesNike2015$30,000,000/yr10 yrlifetime Nike extension widely reported above $30M a yearفوربس.كوم
Stephen CurryUnder Armour2016$20,000,000/yr10 yrUnder Armour partnership reported around $20M a year plus equity economicsفوربس.كوم
Roger FedererUniqlo2018$30,000,000/yr10 yrUniqlo lifetime deal reported near $300M over 10 yearsفوربس.كوم
Tiger WoodsNike2000$20,000,000/yr5 yrpeak Nike-era golf deals reported in the tens of millions annuallyفوربس.كوم
Cristiano RonaldoNike2016$18,000,000/yr10 yrNike lifetime deal reported around $1B total / high-teens millions a yearفوربس.كوم
Penélope CruzL'Oréal2006$2,000,000/yr12 yrWikipedia filmography / career section states she receives $2 million a year as a L'Oréal spokesmodel (multiyear relationship from 2006)en.wikipedia.org
Scarlett JohanssonL'Oréal2006$4,000,000/yr2 yrJanuary 2006 trade and tabloid reporting (AceShowbiz, Mirror and peers) put her global L'Oréal face deal at about $4M; booked as a two-year ambassadorship at that annual rate rather than a single-day shoot feeaceshowbiz.com
Leonardo DiCaprioOPPO2011$5,000,000/yr1 yrRadar Online, 6 Apr 2011: reportedly $5M for an overseas OPPO mobile TV campaign; one engagement, not a multi-year beauty contractradaronline.com
undisclosed endorsement lanes use the median annual fee and median term of these rows

Hyphenate credit floor

Credit-scale floor
CreditRateBasisSource
director_scale_floor$268,008DGA 2023-24 theatrical minimum for films over $11M: $20,616 a week across the guaranteed 13-week term (2 prep + 10 shoot + 1 cutting); used as the per-credit floor for producer, director, executive producer, and writer credits since producers have no union minimumdga.org

Lane benchmarks

Lane benchmarks
LaneRateValueBasisSource
merchconversion_per_drop_low0.0050.5-2% of an engaged audience buys per merch drop; the low end is used with one drop a year assumedcustomink.com
merchaov_usd25unisex tees in the $19-25 range outsell every other creator product category; $25 usedmerchtitans.com
merchmargin_pod0.25typical print-on-demand seller margin is about 25%merchtitans.com
merchmargin_owned0.50owned-brand stores target 40-50% margins; 50% used for owned merch brandsmerchtitans.com
audienceviews_per_fan_per_year50assumption: an engaged fan watches about one video a week, converting yearly views into unique engaged fansassumption, published to be challenged
membershiptake_rate_engaged0.001industry guides put entertainment-channel membership conversion at 0.5-1% of subscribers; 0.1% of engaged unique fans is used to reflect inactive subscriber basesfluxnote.io
membershipmonthly_fee_usd4.99the most common membership tier pricefluxnote.io
membershipcreator_share0.70YouTube pays creators 70% of membership revenuefluxnote.io
musicspotify_subscriber_share0.322Spotify held 32.2% of global music subscribers at the end of 2024 per MIDiA; other platforms are estimated by scaling Spotify royalties to the whole marketbillboard.com
musicfeature_artist_share0.25assumption: a featured artist keeps about a quarter of the lead-artist share on tracks they feature onassumption, published to be challenged
shortsfund_era_rpm_usd0.02low bound of the measured Shorts RPM range ($0.02-1.48 by niche, AIR Media-Tech study), used to price Shorts Fund era views before February 2023air.io
residualscast_pool_rate0.036SAG-AFTRA theatrical residuals pay 3.6% of the distributor's gross receipts in the TV windows, with home video on a similar royalty basewrapbook.com
residualspost_theatrical_dgr_vs_boxoffice0.50assumption: lifetime post-theatrical distributor receipts approximated at half of theatrical box officeassumption, published to be challenged
residualslead_share_of_pool0.33assumption: a lead performer's time-and-salary weighted share of the cast residual poolassumption, published to be challenged
residualssupporting_share_of_pool0.08assumption: a supporting performer's share of the cast residual poolassumption, published to be challenged
residualsbudget_to_bo_proxy2.0assumption: when theatrical box office is unreported, lifetime receipts for residual and backend expected-value purposes are approximated at 2x production budget (a muted worldwide multiple; films that truly bombed still overstate, hits understate)assumption, published to be challenged
rolepost_breakthrough_supporting_ratio0.12assumption: a post-breakthrough supporting or featured role clears about 12% of the contemporaneous lead comps cell (far above the ~2.5% pre-stardom ratio, far below a lead quote); published so it can be challenged and replaced with more disclosed supporting dealsassumption, published to be challenged
socialper_1k_post_small15Instagram sponsored posts run $10-20 per 1,000 followers for accounts under ~1M; $15 midpoint usedinfluencermarketinghub.com
socialper_1k_post_mid10per-1k rate compresses as accounts scale; $10 per 1,000 used for 1M-25M reach, between the micro benchmark and the mega anchorinfluencermarketinghub.com
socialper_1k_post_mega6Hopper HQ 2024 Rich List: Ronaldo/Kardashian/Johnson/Beyonce all land near $6 per 1,000 followers per sponsored post at 300M+ reach; used for 25M+ accountshopperhq.com
socialsponsored_posts_per_year6assumption: about six standalone paid brand posts a year across Instagram and TikTok, held below monthly because many brand deals bundle social posts with the YouTube integration already countedassumption, published to be challenged
socialstart_year2016assumption: brand-sponsorship on creator social feeds treated as material from 2016; earlier years scale toward zero with audienceassumption, published to be challenged
sponsor_floorgeneral0.05When the description-scan sponsor share lands below 5% of long-form views, lift to 5%: industry mid-tier integration cadence for general entertainment once a channel is monetized at scaleindustry_synthesis
sponsor_floorgaming0.03Gaming integrations run thinner than general entertainment; 3% floor of long-form views when the scan under-detectsindustry_synthesis
sponsor_floortech_lifestyle0.12Tech and lifestyle review channels integrate hardware and DTC brands heavily; 12% floor of long-form viewsindustry_synthesis
sponsor_floorfinance0.15Finance and investing channels run dense brand integrations; 15% floor of long-form viewsindustry_synthesis
sponsor_floorscience_diy0.10Education and science channels commonly host mid-roll integrations; 10% floorindustry_synthesis
sponsor_floorauto0.10Auto review channels commonly host brand and dealer integrations; 10% floorindustry_synthesis
sponsor_floorreal_estate0.12Real-estate creator integrations are dense relative to views; 12% floorindustry_synthesis
sponsor_floorkids0.01Made-for-kids inventory rarely carries classic mid-roll brand reads; 1% floor only, with licensing captured in other_income or businessesindustry_synthesis
sponsor_floorstart_year2015Sponsor-floor guard applies from 2015, when creator brand deals became material at scaleassumption, published to be challenged
sponsor_floormin_long_views5000000Floor only lifts years with at least 5M long-form views so early career years stay measured-onlyassumption, published to be challenged
socialyt_proxy_haircut0.35When IG/TT followers are unknown, combined social reach is estimated at 35% of YouTube subscribers: mega YouTube audiences do not map 1:1 onto Instagram or TikTokindustry_synthesis
socialposts_per_year_small8smaller accounts post paid brand content a bit more often relative to reach; ~8 standalone paid posts/year across IG+TTassumption, published to be challenged
socialposts_per_year_mid6mid-tier accounts: about six standalone paid brand posts a year across IG+TTassumption, published to be challenged
socialposts_per_year_mega4mega accounts take fewer but larger brand posts; ~4 standalone paid posts/year across IG+TT to avoid double-counting bundled YT dealsassumption, published to be challenged
merchconv_mult_kids1.6kids channels convert merch harder (toy/apparel drops); 1.6x the baseline 0.5% conversionindustry_synthesis
merchconv_mult_gaming1.2gaming audiences buy drops above baseline entertainmentindustry_synthesis
merchconv_mult_tech_lifestyle0.9tech audiences convert merch slightly below entertainment baselineindustry_synthesis
merchconv_mult_finance0.7finance audiences buy less merch; brand deals dominateindustry_synthesis
merchconv_mult_science_diy0.8education/science merch converts below entertainment baselineindustry_synthesis
membershipauto_enable_min_subs1000000when memberships_enabled is unset, non-kids channels at or above this subscriber count estimate membershipsassumption, published to be challenged
box_officebo_multiple_micro1.028median worldwide box-office / budget among roster films in the micro band with both figures reported (ratios above 30x dropped as data errors); used only when theatrical gross is missingmeasured_roster
box_officebo_multiple_small1.146median worldwide box-office / budget among roster films in the small band with both figures reported (ratios above 30x dropped as data errors); used only when theatrical gross is missingmeasured_roster
box_officebo_multiple_mid1.747median worldwide box-office / budget among roster films in the mid band with both figures reported (ratios above 30x dropped as data errors); used only when theatrical gross is missingmeasured_roster
box_officebo_multiple_large2.127median worldwide box-office / budget among roster films in the large band with both figures reported (ratios above 30x dropped as data errors); used only when theatrical gross is missingmeasured_roster
box_officebo_multiple_tentpole2.859median worldwide box-office / budget among roster films in the tentpole band with both figures reported (ratios above 30x dropped as data errors); used only when theatrical gross is missingmeasured_roster
box_officebo_multiple_blockbuster4.089median worldwide box-office / budget among roster films in the blockbuster band with both figures reported (ratios above 30x dropped as data errors); used only when theatrical gross is missingmeasured_roster
savingsentertainment_savings_factor0.88central estimate: entertainment-industry households save about 12% less of after-tax income than the SCF top brackets imply at the same cash income, reflecting lumpy careers, entourage, and security costs; applied to actors/athletes only; court spending_overrides still winassumption, published to be challenged
portfoliosecurities_share0.55central estimate of investable financial assets as a share of unmarked career savings for high-earning entertainment households (rest treated as real-estate-like)assumption, published to be challenged
portfolioreal_estate_like_share0.45complement of securities_share; unmarked savings not in securities compound at the US long-run home appreciation rate instead of 60/40assumption, published to be challenged
backendmin_bo_budget_ratio_for_ev1.0expected-value backend only attaches when reported or proxied box office is at least 1.0x budget (commercial viability filter); pure flops rarely pay meaningful pointsassumption, published to be challenged
backendspread_years3backend cash is spread across the release year and the next two calendar years rather than booked entirely at releaseassumption, published to be challenged
film_payadvance_share_prior_year0.30central estimate: about 30% of an upfront is received in the calendar year before release (deposit/start fee), 70% in the release yearassumption, published to be challenged
hyphenatepost_bt_package_multiplier4.0post-breakthrough producer/EP package credits on a lead role are modeled at 4x the DGA theatrical scale floor (still a floor relative to true packages)assumption, published to be challenged
tvrecurring_episodes_per_year6assumption: a recurring television credit with no stated episode count is booked at six episodes per credited year, roughly half a traditional broadcast season arc; a stated count always winsassumption, published to be challenged
tvguest_episodes_default2assumption: a guest or cameo television credit with no stated episode count is booked at two episodesassumption, published to be challenged
rows whose source reads as an assumption are exactly that; they are published so they can be challenged and replaced with better data

Inflation

A net worth is a figure in today’s dollars, and ours already is: every year’s income is booked in that year’s money and compounded forward at the market’s actual returns, so a 1995 paycheck arrives at its real present-day value. What we also do is run the fixed-dollar assumptions above through the price level of the year they apply to. A $25 merchandise order, a $4.99 membership, a per-post rate, and the savings-rate brackets are all today’s figures, so we deflate them with the Consumer Price Index before applying them to an earlier year. That keeps a 2010 estimate priced in 2010 money. Film salaries are already era-specific, so they need no adjustment.

Consumer Price Index (CPI-U), selected years
YearIndex (1982-84 = 100)BasisSource
197553.8BLS CPI-U annual average (1982-84=100)bls.gov
198082.4BLS CPI-U المتوسط ​​السنويbls.gov
1985107.6BLS CPI-U المتوسط ​​السنويbls.gov
1990130.7BLS CPI-U المتوسط ​​السنويbls.gov
1995152.4BLS CPI-U المتوسط ​​السنويbls.gov
2000172.2BLS CPI-U المتوسط ​​السنويbls.gov
2005195.3BLS CPI-U المتوسط ​​السنويbls.gov
2010218.1BLS CPI-U المتوسط ​​السنويbls.gov
2015237.0BLS CPI-U المتوسط ​​السنويbls.gov
2020258.8BLS CPI-U المتوسط ​​السنويbls.gov
2021271.0BLS CPI-U المتوسط ​​السنويbls.gov
2022292.7BLS CPI-U المتوسط ​​السنويbls.gov
2023304.7BLS CPI-U المتوسط ​​السنويbls.gov
2024313.7BLS CPI-U المتوسط ​​السنويbls.gov
2025322.1BLS CPI-U annual average (estimate pending final release)bls.gov
2026330.0BLS CPI-U (2026 partial-year estimate)bls.gov
the full annual series drives the model; five-year steps and recent years are shown here

Real estate, business stakes, and memberships

A documented property purchase adds only its appreciation, never the purchase price, since the money spent is already counted in the person’s savings. We grow each documented purchase at its metro’s long-run rate below, net a 7% selling cost. Business stakes enter from a real transaction where one exists, otherwise revenue times a comparable multiple, with a 25% discount for a minority holding in a private company. Channel memberships are counted only for the channels we confirmed have them switched on: of the roster, seven do and the rest do not, so we do not estimate membership income for a channel that has the feature turned off.

Home-price appreciation and selling costs
MetroRateBasisSource
US4.5%long-run US national nominal home-price appreciation, S&P/Case-Shiller National Indexfred.stlouisfed.org
الولايات المتحدة-كاليفورنيا6.0%long-run Los Angeles / coastal California nominal appreciation, S&P/Case-Shiller LA Indexfred.stlouisfed.org
الولايات المتحدة ونيويورك5.0%long-run New York metro nominal appreciation, S&P/Case-Shiller NY Indexfred.stlouisfed.org
US-FL5.5%long-run Miami / South Florida nominal appreciation, S&P/Case-Shiller Miami Indexfred.stlouisfed.org
UK5.0%long-run UK nominal house-price appreciation, Nationwide House Price Indexnationwidehousepriceindex.co.uk
selling_costs7%agent commission plus closing and transfer costs on a sale, standard 6-8% (7% midpoint)bankrate.com
Cuba3.0%assumption: thin foreign-currency Havana market; Cuban outlets report premium-district prices rising, modest nominal appreciation assumeden.cibercuba.com
France4.0%long-run French nominal house-price appreciation, INSEE-Notaires indexinsee.fr
Australia5.5%long-run Australian capital-city nominal appreciation, ABS/CoreLogicabs.gov.au
Cambodia4.0%assumption: thin market; Phnom Penh/BKK-area price reporting shows steady nominal growthrealestate.com.kh
Greece3.0%assumption: Aegean island holiday-home market; steady nominal growthbankofgreece.gr
Bahamas4.5%assumption: private-island and coastal market tracks US coastal appreciationbahamasrealty.com
Belize4.0%assumption: thin coastal market; modest nominal growthbelizetourismboard.org
applied only to purchases documented in published reporting
رسوم التمثيل
FeeRateApplies toBasisSource
agent10%all_actorstalent agency commission capped at 10% under SAG-AFTRA franchise rules; the industry standardsagaftra.org
attorney5%all_actorsentertainment attorney convention of 5% of deals, standard industry practice per trade coveragehollywoodreporter.com
manager10%documented_onlybusiness/talent manager 10% applied only where a manager relationship is documented (e.g. Depp x TMG per 2017 court filings)hollywoodreporter.com

The backtest scorecard

A model that publishes its rates also has to publish its misses. We grade ours against every answer we can find that did not come from another estimator: court records, Companies House filings, real transactions, and on-the-record statements. Street estimates never count as ground truth, because they are somebody else’s model. Three numbers per test, per our published protocol: the median absolute error, the direction of the bias, and the worst miss. Last computed 2026-08-03, and recomputed with every model release.

Test 1: predicting disclosed salaries blind

The engine’s main modeled component prices an undisclosed lead role at the median of disclosed salaries for its era and budget band, blended with the actor’s own disclosed quote history when available, floored at 70% of recent personal max, and capped at 15% of the film’s budget. We turned that mechanism on its own table: for each of the 100 disclosed established-lead salaries above, we removed the row, rebuilt the medians without it, and predicted the figure cold. Median absolute error: 20%. The signed median is -5% and 54% of predictions come in low, so the mechanism leans under, the direction a floor should lean. 84% of predictions land within 50% of the true figure, and on ordinary market-rate deals (excluding known scale/far-below outliers as targets) the core median absolute error is 19%.

Salary mechanism, leave-one-out cross-validation
MetricValueThe story
Predictions tested100
Median absolute error20%
Core median absolute error (ex scale/outlier targets)19%98 ordinary market-rate deals
Bias directionunder (54% of predictions low, signed median -5%)
Worst overshoot+1,400%Natalie Portman took a reported $1,200,000 scale fee on Thor: Love and Thunder while the comps said millions; a star deliberately working below quote is invisible to comps
Worst undershoot-73%Sylvester Stallone on Rambo III (1988), priced just as her market rate jumped

Test 2: whole-model checks against documented wealth

Blind model vs documented figures
CaseModel, blindDocumentedErrorBasis
KSI (blind income model vs Companies House register)$18,354,297$227,767,471-92%Solaris UK Holdings and four other companies: filed net assets x his registered PSC bands, GBP at 1.27 the income model never saw a Prime distribution because none was ever documented; the register caught what the exclusions policy forced the model to leave out. Register data is an input from now on, so this stays the blind run of record.
Ali-A (blind income model vs Companies House register)$9,273,781$10,447,310-11%Ali-A Entertainment Limited filed net assets x PSC band, GBP at 1.27
Cars & Bids valuation (Doug DeMuro, model v1)$34,000,000$62,000,000-45%The Chernin Group's January 2023 majority investment implied roughly $62M; Doug has since described it as an $80M sale
Theorist Media valuation (MatPat, model v1)$27,100,000$50,000,000-46%the undisclosed Lunar X deal was pegged at $40-60M by industry coverage; midpoint used
median absolute error 45%; bias under in every case (the exclusions floor working as designed)

Test 3: career income vs court records

Johnny Depp career gross 2003-2016: the model counts $644,256,538 of film income against the $650,000,000 his former managers documented in court, an error of -1%. counted income in the window vs the court-documented total; under is the designed direction when estimated lanes hold the rest.

Tom Cruise career gross 1981-2022: the model counts $837,271,935 of film income against the $1,000,000,000 his former managers documented in court, an error of -16%. model share of documented career-earnings anchor.

Test 4: documented floors

Floor checks
CaseDocumented floorModelResultBasis
DanTDM$8,219,786$36,465,297holdsTheDiamondminecart Limited and two other companies, filed net assets x PSC bands
Mrwhosetheboss$5,918,871$12,549,506holdsBoss Global Media and Boss Global Properties, filed net assets x PSC bands
Emma Watson$-360,277.00$35,955,510holdsBreadcrumb Productions filed net assets (negative) x PSC band
Jason Statham$540,616$122,718,443holdseight UK companies, filed net assets x PSC bands
Mark Rober / CrunchLabs$50,000,000$49,400,000holdsRober has said he turned down a $50M investment offer; the model's blind valuation sits just under it
5 of 5 documented floors hold

The pattern across all four tests is the same: the model misses low far more often than high, by roughly the size of whatever the exclusions policy forced it to leave out. The KSI row is the clearest lesson this site has produced: no public income lane ever documented a Prime distribution, so the blind model saw 8% of what his own company filings later showed. That is why register data is now an input. If a documented number ever prints below one of our figures, that row goes here too, and the model gets corrected in public.

Every source this site relies on

One rule sits above the hierarchy: outside sources supply individual facts only. A salary, a filing, a settlement, a per-episode fee. No other outlet’s net worth estimate is ever an input to this model, a number we calibrate toward, or ground truth in the scorecard above. We compute the aggregate ourselves, from the facts, and publish every step.

Our sourcing hierarchy, strongest first: official records (company registries, court filings), first-party statements on the record, trade press (Variety, The Hollywood Reporter, Deadline), general press, and last, secondary compilations. One source is banned outright: CelebrityNetWorth, which prints dollar figures without citations and blocks archiving. Any figure that existed only there is treated as undisclosed, and the film models from its budget instead. Remaining secondary sources are accepted only where they attribute a figure to trade or press reporting, are always labeled as what they are, and get replaced whenever the underlying primary report surfaces. Citations point at the outlet that originally reported a figure wherever that original is locatable online; where it exists only in pre-internet print, the verified secondary stands in, names the original publication in the row, and stays on the upgrade queue. The scorecard above exists partly to measure what a table with this mix of sources actually delivers. Below is every domain cited anywhere in the model, with its class and how many citations rest on it.

Every cited domain
SourceClassCitationsUsed for
YouTube Data API (googleapis.com)official recordmeasured views, catalog, disclosure flags
Companies House API (company-information.service.gov.uk)official recordUK company accounts and PSC registers
Internet Archive Wayback Machine (web.archive.org)measured data sourcehistorical channel totals and citation archiving
Kworb (kworb.net)measured data sourcemusic streaming counts
sec.govofficial record1multiples comps
Taxfoundation.orgالحكومية والأكاديمية27athlete economics, tax rates
Tax.ny.govالحكومية والأكاديمية14معدلات الضرائب
irs.govالحكومية والأكاديمية13معدلات الضرائب
ifs.org.ukالحكومية والأكاديمية9معدلات الضرائب
sagaftra.orgالحكومية والأكاديمية7actor rep fees, tv episode rates
dor.ms.govالحكومية والأكاديمية7معدلات الضرائب
ato.gov.auالحكومية والأكاديمية6معدلات الضرائب
piketty.pse.ens.frالحكومية والأكاديمية4savings rates
gov.ukالحكومية والأكاديمية2معدلات الضرائب
Variety.comالصحافة المتخصصة43actor salary disclosures, person configs, tv episode rates
hollywoodreporter.comالصحافة المتخصصة32actor rep fees, actor salary disclosures, person configs, tv episode rates
deadline.comالصحافة المتخصصة9الإفصاح عن راتب الممثل، وتكوينات الشخص
tubefilter.comالصحافة المتخصصة7multiples comps, person configs, rpm disclosures
indiewire.comالصحافة المتخصصة3الكشف عن رواتب الممثلين
فوربس.كوميضعط26actor salary disclosures, endorsement disclosures, person configs
yahoo.comيضعط20الإفصاح عن راتب الممثل، وتكوينات الشخص
newsnationnow.comيضعط6تكوينات الشخص
etonline.comيضعط4الكشف عن رواتب الممثلين
theguardian.comيضعط2الكشف عن رواتب الممثلين
nytimes.comيضعط2person configs, tv episode rates
history.comيضعط1الكشف عن رواتب الممثلين
cinemablend.comيضعط1الكشف عن رواتب الممثلين
cheatsheet.comيضعط1الكشف عن رواتب الممثلين
wsj.comيضعط1stream payouts
bbc.comيضعط1تكوينات الشخص
latimes.comيضعط1تكوينات الشخص
time.comيضعط1تكوينات الشخص
cnbc.comيضعط1تكوينات الشخص
api.worldbank.orgaggregator423fx rates
bls.govaggregator52cpi index
Parade.comaggregator43الإفصاح عن راتب الممثل، وتكوينات الشخص
slickcharts.comaggregator42benchmark returns
youtube.comaggregator27person configs, rpm disclosures
Taxsummaries.pwc.comaggregator19معدلات الضرائب
إلينوي.govaggregator18معدلات الضرائب
screenrant.comaggregator16الإفصاح عن راتب الممثل، وتكوينات الشخص
dor.sc.govaggregator13معدلات الضرائب
billboard.comaggregator11lane benchmarks, person configs
Incometaxindia.gov.inaggregator11معدلات الضرائب
twitch.tvaggregator11تكوينات الشخص
nj.govaggregator10معدلات الضرائب
en.wikipedia.orgaggregator9actor salary disclosures, endorsement disclosures, person configs
dor.georgia.govaggregator9معدلات الضرائب
الإيرادات. louisiana.govaggregator9معدلات الضرائب
content.leg.colorado.govaggregator9معدلات الضرائب
outlierkit.comaggregator8rpm disclosures, sponsor cpm sources
sede.agenciatributaria.gob.esaggregator8معدلات الضرائب
Mass.govaggregator8معدلات الضرائب
archive.legmt.govaggregator8معدلات الضرائب
tfhawaii.orgaggregator8معدلات الضرائب
dexerto.comaggregator8تكوينات الشخص
gov.braggregator7معدلات الضرائب
ncdor.govaggregator7معدلات الضرائب
azdor.govaggregator7معدلات الضرائب
Tax.newmexico.govaggregator7معدلات الضرائب
الإيرادات.nebraska.govaggregator7معدلات الضرائب
pollstar.comaggregator7تكوينات الشخص
cga.ct.govaggregator6معدلات الضرائب
tax.virginia.govaggregator6معدلات الضرائب
hollywood.comaggregator6تكوينات الشخص
tiktok.comaggregator6تكوينات الشخص
oregon.govaggregator5معدلات الضرائب
therichest.comaggregator4الكشف عن رواتب الممثلين
nbpa.comaggregator4athlete rep fees
air.ioaggregator4lane benchmarks, rpm disclosures
fred.stlouisfed.orgaggregator4أسعار العقارات
portal.ct.govaggregator4معدلات الضرائب
www2.gov.bc.caaggregator4معدلات الضرائب
producermichael.comaggregator4تكوينات الشخص
imdb.comaggregator3الإفصاح عن راتب الممثل، وتكوينات الشخص
slate.comaggregator3الإفصاح عن راتب الممثل، وتكوينات الشخص
aol.comaggregator3الكشف عن رواتب الممثلين
wwd.comaggregator3endorsement disclosures, person configs
merchtitans.comaggregator3lane benchmarks
fluxnote.ioaggregator3lane benchmarks
influencermarketinghub.comaggregator3lane benchmarks, rpm disclosures
post-bridge.comaggregator3الإفصاحات دورة في الدقيقة
miraflow.aiaggregator3الإفصاحات دورة في الدقيقة
creatorsagency.coaggregator3sponsor cpm sources
montanabudget.orgaggregator3معدلات الضرائب
hitaxfairness.orgaggregator3معدلات الضرائب
revenue.wi.govaggregator3معدلات الضرائب
dor.mo.govaggregator3معدلات الضرائب
ksrevenue.govaggregator3معدلات الضرائب
bir.gov.phaggregator3معدلات الضرائب
news.pollstar.comaggregator3تكوينات الشخص
riaa.comaggregator3تكوينات الشخص
filmindustry.networkaggregator2الكشف عن رواتب الممثلين
supercarblondie.comaggregator2الكشف عن رواتب الممثلين
fandomwire.comaggregator2الكشف عن رواتب الممثلين
abcnews.go.comaggregator2الكشف عن رواتب الممثلين
collider.comaggregator2الإفصاح عن راتب الممثل، وتكوينات الشخص
dga.orgaggregator2credit scale, person configs
axios.comaggregator2multiples comps
vidchops.comaggregator2الإفصاحات دورة في الدقيقة
skatteverket.seaggregator2معدلات الضرائب
nta.go.jpaggregator2معدلات الضرائب
tax.vermont.govaggregator2معدلات الضرائب
impots.gouv.fraggregator2معدلات الضرائب
tax.ohio.govaggregator2معدلات الضرائب
hklaw.comaggregator2معدلات الضرائب
in.govaggregator2معدلات الضرائب
tax.org.ukaggregator2معدلات الضرائب
gov.hkaggregator2معدلات الضرائب
mtrevenue.govaggregator2معدلات الضرائب
en.service-public.mcaggregator2معدلات الضرائب
agenziaentrate.gov.itaggregator2معدلات الضرائب
zatca.gov.saaggregator2معدلات الضرائب
revenue.ieaggregator2معدلات الضرائب
agenciatributaria.esaggregator2معدلات الضرائب
fox13seattle.comaggregator2تكوينات الشخص
the-numbers.comaggregator2تكوينات الشخص
prnewswire.comaggregator2تكوينات الشخص
kick.comaggregator2تكوينات الشخص
scmp.comaggregator2تكوينات الشخص
faroutmagazine.co.ukaggregator1الكشف عن رواتب الممثلين
wegotthiscovered.comaggregator1الكشف عن رواتب الممثلين
cbr.comaggregator1الكشف عن رواتب الممثلين
tampabay.comaggregator1الكشف عن رواتب الممثلين
koimoi.comaggregator1الكشف عن رواتب الممثلين
looper.comaggregator1الكشف عن رواتب الممثلين
nber.orgaggregator1athlete economics
bvresources.comaggregator1athlete economics
nba.comaggregator1athlete jock tax
wnba.comaggregator1athlete jock tax
nfl.comaggregator1athlete jock tax
mlb.comaggregator1athlete jock tax
nhl.comaggregator1athlete jock tax
nflpa.comaggregator1athlete rep fees
mlbplayers.comaggregator1athlete rep fees
nhlpa.comaggregator1athlete rep fees
fifa.comaggregator1athlete rep fees
atptour.comaggregator1athlete rep fees
pgatour.comaggregator1athlete rep fees
boxrec.comaggregator1athlete rep fees
ufc.comaggregator1athlete rep fees
formula1.comaggregator1athlete rep fees
nascar.comaggregator1athlete rep fees
bcci.tvaggregator1athlete rep fees
worldathletics.orgaggregator1athlete rep fees
usagym.orgaggregator1athlete rep fees
usaswimming.orgaggregator1athlete rep fees
fis-ski.comaggregator1athlete rep fees
worldsnowboardtour.comaggregator1athlete rep fees
theboardr.comaggregator1athlete rep fees
indycar.comaggregator1athlete rep fees
rbcwealthmanagement.comaggregator1benchmark returns
caselaw.findlaw.comaggregator1endorsement disclosures
luxurydaily.comaggregator1endorsement disclosures
fashionista.comaggregator1endorsement disclosures
aceshowbiz.comaggregator1endorsement disclosures
radaronline.comaggregator1endorsement disclosures
customink.comaggregator1lane benchmarks
wrapbook.comaggregator1lane benchmarks
hopperhq.comaggregator1lane benchmarks
retaildive.comaggregator1multiples comps
linkedin.comaggregator1multiples comps
nationwidehousepriceindex.co.ukaggregator1أسعار العقارات
bankrate.comaggregator1أسعار العقارات
en.cibercuba.comaggregator1أسعار العقارات
insee.fraggregator1أسعار العقارات
abs.gov.auaggregator1أسعار العقارات
realestate.com.khaggregator1أسعار العقارات
bankofgreece.graggregator1أسعار العقارات
bahamasrealty.comaggregator1أسعار العقارات
belizetourismboard.orgaggregator1أسعار العقارات
blackhatworld.comaggregator1الإفصاحات دورة في الدقيقة
upgrowth.inaggregator1الإفصاحات دورة في الدقيقة
gyre.proaggregator1الإفصاحات دورة في الدقيقة
pastory.appaggregator1الإفصاحات دورة في الدقيقة
influencerfee.comaggregator1sponsor cpm sources
creatorsjet.comaggregator1sponsor cpm sources
chartlex.comaggregator1stream payouts
artists.spotify.comaggregator1stream payouts
distrokid.comaggregator1stream payouts
tax.hawaii.govaggregator1معدلات الضرائب
okdiario.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
content.time.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
diffuser.fmaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
thelist.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
thewrap.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
ir.hanesbrands.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
globalnews.caaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
tmz.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
eonline.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
deseret.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
playbill.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
benzinga.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
chiefmarketer.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
simonandschuster.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
people.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
upi.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
publishersweekly.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
streeteasy.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
texasmonthly.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
amlu.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
campaignlive.co.ukaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
sothebys.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
mutualart.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
money.cnn.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
aphmau.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
theverge.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
open.spotify.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
win.ggaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
x.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
fazeclan.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
inverse.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
playboard.coaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
streamscharts.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
investors.dicks.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
si.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
sherdog.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
cbsnews.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
marketingbrew.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
businesswire.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
hypebeast.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
kidsdiana.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
cbinsights.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
espn.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
badlefthook.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
boxinginsider.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
en.cryptonomist.chaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
techcrunch.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
migrationology.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
electrastarmgmt.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
ninja.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
tsuki.marketaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
pokimane.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
sportskeeda.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
bloomberg.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
stack3d.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
capitalfm.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
tryguys.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
buzzfeednews.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
esportsearnings.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
patreon.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
vladandniki.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
seekdiscomfort.comaggregator1تكوينات الشخص
counts cover every rate table and person config in the model; each individual row above and on every person page carries its own link

Reproduce any page

Each page lists its raw inputs, retrieval dates, and rate-table version. The YouTube Data API is free, Kworb and the Internet Archive are public, and every rate above cites its source. Apply the rates to the measured numbers year by year, as shown in each page’s table, and you will land on our figure. If you cannot, write to us, because one of us has a bug.

Our Methodology for Calculating the صافي الثروة of Public Personalities Our earlier method (retired), kept for the record. Every YouTuber and actor page now runs on our model, documented above.

Before we shifted our focus to software and SaaS, NetWorth Explained built its reputation on transparent celebrity net worth estimates. Rather than publishing a single headline figure, we modeled each person's earnings from the ground up: what a role typically pays as a share of a film's budget, how much of the box office flows back to the talent, the cut taken by agents and managers, realistic investment returns, and the cost of the lifestyle that money supports. The tables below show the exact assumptions behind the film model we use for actors, followed by the model we use for YouTubers and creators, and finally a look at how our numbers have held up when real deal prices became public. We deliberately keep every input conservative so the final number reflects what someone is worth at a minimum.

Upfront Compensation
Role% of Movie Budget
Lead8.5%
Lead + S9.5%
الرصاص + د10.5%
Lead + DS11.5%
Supporting3.5%
Supporting + S4.0%
Supporting + D4.5%
Supporting + DS5.0%
Variables
Gross points as a percentage of box office as Lead + EP5.0%
Gross points as a percentage of box office as Lead4.0%
Gross points as a percentage of box office as Supporting + EP3.0%
Gross points as a percentage of box office as Supporting1.0%
Return on investment after expenses6.5%
Film studio box office retention40.0%
Attorney, business manager and agent commission15.0%
Withdrawn from cumulative annually20.0%
Maximum withdrawal from cumulative annually$7,382,182
Maximum upfront pay derived from the budget$25,000,000
Annual Personal Expenditures
Home maintenance (cleaning, landscaping, repairs, property taxes)$400,000
Personal assistant$85,000
Secretary$65,000
Security (x4)$460,000
Publicist$70,000
Aircraft charter ($8,000 an hour x 200 hours, or 10 international roundtrips)$1,600,000
Vacation ($7,500 a day x 90 days)$675,000
Dining ($120 per person x 4 people x 365 days)$175,200
Transportation$430,000
Clothing ($4,500 x 12 outfits)$54,000
Gifts & donations$46,000
Total$4,060,200
Pre-tax withdrawal amount at 45% tax rate$7,382,182

Notes

  • Every estimate you see on NetWorth Explained (NWE) is a "at least worth this number," not a "could be worth up to this number" because NWE takes a conservative approach to maximize accuracy.
  • 6.5% investment ROI, instead of the S&P's average annualized return of 9.4% over the last 50 years
  • Film studio box office retention of 40% instead of 50%
  • Business manager and agent commission of 15% instead of 10%
  • Generous withdrawal amount of $7.4M
  • Excluding income from pre-breakthrough roles
  • The maximum annual withdrawal and maximum upfront pay is inflation adjusted, which removes the effect of price inflation
  • Some budget and box office data is unavailable especially when content is produced for a streaming platform like Netflix. Those have been adjusted conservatively to comparable films.
  • All film data from Wikipedia. Consumer Price Index data from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Why We Show Our Work

Before we created this publication, there wasn't a single website that showed exactly how someone's net worth was calculated. Even major publications refused to disclose their methods, hiding behind vague claims of a "proprietary algorithm." Math is not a secret; it's simply a shield from scrutiny.

That's why our math and reasoning is always transparent. That's NetWorth Explained.